HOW COVID19 PANDEMIC IS AFFECTING ITALY: IMPACT, RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

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Abstract

This paper aims at providing an overview of dynamics of the COVID19 pandemic in Italy, how the country has been affected, has responded and is reacting, having the unpleasant role of "first mover" in the first wave and suffering for the second wave. Part of the negative effects was due to lack of preparedness for a such event. Their extent was amplified by a fragile health system.

In Italy the first case of COVID19 was officially detected on 21st February 2020. At the beginning of April Italy ranks third for infected cases (after USA and Spain) but unfortunately first for both the number of deaths (18.279 on 9th April) and the fatality rate. Number of deaths and number of occupied intensive care beds demonstrate: the occurrence of two waves of the COVID19 pandemic; and, a COVID19 contamination not homogeneously distributed on the Italian territory. Four key dates are taken into account for a deep understanding of the situation in the Italian regions: 9th April 2020 (just after the pick of the first wave), 31st July 2020 (at the end of the first wave), 15th October 2020 (at the beginning of the second wave) and 15th November 2020 (at the pick of the second wave (?)).

Nine months after the first Italian COVID19 case, the Italian government had to re-define restriction measures and to implement a new combination of response and recovery actions. For this second wave, a restriction approach at regional level was preferred to a national lock down (as during the first wave). A scientific robust approach defined by the Italian Ministry of Health at the end of April was implemented at the beginning of November. 21 indicators were used to define four possible scenarios (with an assigned a "severity colour"). Italian regions became yellow, orange and red. None of them was recognised green and the situation worsen during November (with gradual increase of the number "orange" and "red" regions).

Effects of this new approach at regional level need more time to be appreciated. In any case lessons learnt from the first wave can be used to understand how to better address socio-economic challenges of the second wave and of a new world with a persistent COVID19 threat. Approaches and tools to predict new types/other waves of pandemics (not only in Italy) needs also to be considered.


Keywords: COVID19, Italy, regions, health system, deaths, intensive care beds.

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Introduction

This paper aims at providing an overview of dynamics of the COVID19 pandemic in Italy, how the country has been affected, has responded and is reacting, having the unpleasant role of "first mover" in the first wave and suffering for the second wave. Part of the negative effects was due to lack of preparedness for a such event. Their extent was amplified by a fragile health system.

The Italian Health system (i.e. the "National healthcare service" – "Servizio Sanitario Nazionale" – SSN is a «universal» system answering to the "right to health" of all the citizens (guaranteed by the Italian Constitution - Art. 32). Such system is public and system financially supported by taxes and by (mostly) «out of the market» costs of the provided health services. «Private accredited» health structures are part of the SSN. The high-level provisions/targets at national level (i.e. the Italian Ministry of Health) guide the health services management (and the related budget) of the Italian regions (i.e. based on subsidiarity principle).



Source: maps created by the authors with data from Ministero della Salute (2019)

Italy as a "first mover"

In Italy the first case of COVID19 was officially detected on 21st February 2020, although preliminary findings of some studies indicate that virus was already in some areas of the country in January. The Italian government reacted in a couple of weeks defining restriction measures in all the Italian territories that became red zones for almost one month (i.e. Decree of the Council of Ministries on 8th March).

The first month of COVID19 pandemic in Italy

- 21st February First official COVID19 case in Codogno, epidemic outbreak in Vo' Euganeo and first death in Padova
- 22nd February DPCM* Red zone for 10 municipalities in the Province of Lodi and in Vo' Euganeo (in the province of Padova). 76 COVID19 cases
- 24th February DPCM Restriction measures (e.g. education institutions closed) in six Italian regions (Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Liguria)
- 4th March DPCM Education institutions closed in Italy with additional restriction measures (e.g. movie theaters closed)
- 6^h March The Italian government allocates 7,5 billion euros to immediately support consumers and enterprises
- 7th March DPCM Lombardia and other 14 provinces become red zone.
- 8th March DPCM Restriction measures in all the Italian territories that become red zones for almost one month. (e.g. only a limited number of commercial activities such as those providing food, drugs remained open).
- 12st March More than 1,000 deaths from 21st February
- 18th March DPCM "Cura Italia".
 The Italian government allocates 25
 billion euro to address the COVID19
 emergency. Cemeteries in the
 Province of Bergamo are no more
 able to manage deaths. The army is
 required to transport deaths in other
 regions.
- 19th March Italy with 3,405 fatalities becomes the country with the highest number of COVID deaths in the world.




*Decree of the Presidency of the Council of Ministries

A way to measure the capacity to cope with COVID19 pandemic

Occupied intensive care (IC) beds and number of deaths can be used as a proxy of the severity of the COVID19 pandemic at a certain date.


Occupied intensive care (IC) beds on the total available provide also an indication of the response capacity and the reliability of the health system. In Italy IC beds endowment at regional level is very heterogeneous. At the end of October 2020 there were 7,092 available intensive care beds in Italy. The regional endowment ranges from 20 IC beds in Valle d'Aosta to 1,036 IC beds in Lombardia. Such situation is confirmed by taking into account the number of inhabitants of each region. There are 77 intensive care beds/million inhabitants in Calabria and the region with the highest number intensive care beds/million inhabitants is Veneto with more than double beds (i.e. 168).



Source: maps created by the authors with data from Ministero della Salute (2019)

Data of occupied intensive care (IC) beds and of number of deaths from 24th February 2020 on the Italian situation clearly show two waves.

People in intensive care and deaths in Italy



Source: graph created by the authors with open daily data provided by Protezione Civile

Four key dates are taken into account for a deep understanding of the situation in the Italian regions: 9th April 2020¹ (just after the pick of the first wave), 31st July 2020² (at the end of the first wave), 15th October 2020 (at the beginning of the second wave) and 15th November 2020 (at the pick of the second wave (?)).

¹ The TIEMS Italian Chapter reported the Italian situation of the COVID19 pandemic on 9th April 2020 with a dedicated article on the newsletter of TIEMS International (issue 38).


² The TIEMS Italian Chapter reported the Italian situation of the COVID19 pandemic on 31st July 2020 with a dedicated article on the newsletter of TIEMS International (issue 39).

9th April 2020


According to John Hopkins University data on the COVID19 contamination in the world by country, at the beginning of April Italy ranks third for infected cases (after USA and Spain)(i.e. more than 143.000 infected people) but unfortunately first for both the number of deaths (18.279 on 9th April) and the fatality rate. During the first week of April number of COVID intensive care beds were more than 4.000. COVID19 contamination was not homogeneously distributed on the Italian territory. 1,5 months after the first case, out of the 20 Italian regions the five most affected (i.e. Lombardia, Emilia Romagna, Piemonte, Veneto and Toscana) registered 74,8% of the total COVID19 cases. 54.802 cases (38,3%) were in one region only (i.e. Lombardy region).

1,5 months after the first case (just after the pick of the first wave)

- COVID19 deaths (starting from 24th February) → 18,279.
- COVID19-occupied intensive care beds (on 9th April) → 3,605.
- COVID19 cases (starting from 24th February) → 143,626.



Saturation of the intensive care



Source: map and graph created by the authors eon elaboration of open daily data provided by Protezione Civile

The country with its 60 million inhabitants (the third most populated Member State) was the first in Europe, and to some extent in the world, to be severely impacted. Casualties, stress of the existing health system, social discontent, crisis of key economic sectors (as tourism) are only some of the negative effects of the pandemics.


Response was at national level, combining technical and professional solutions for emergencies with political decisions.

31st July 2020


Five months after the first case, deaths amount to 35.141 and COVID intensive care beds were 41 (on 31st July), but the pandemics assumed a world-wide scope. Italy with 247.537 COVID19 cases was the 15th affected country in the world. The USA were the most affected country with a number of COVID19 cases (4.495.015) and with more than 150.000 deaths. Taking into account of only four countries in South America (i.e. Brasil, Perù, Cile, Colombia) number of COVID19 cases reached 3,5 million and deaths 130.000 units. In this phase, the COVID19 contamination remains not homogeneously distributed on the Italian territory. On 31st July, the five most affected regions (i.e. Lombardia, Piemonte, Emilia Romagna, Veneto and Toscana) registered 76,0% of the total COVID19 cases. More than 95.000 cases (51,1%) in Lombardia region only.

5 months after the first case (at the end of the first wave)

- COVID19 deaths (starting from 24th February) → 35,141.
- COVID19-occupied intensive care beds (on 31st July) → 41.
- **COVID19 cases** (starting from 24th February) → **247,537.**



Saturation of the intensive care



Source: map and graph created by the authors eon elaboration of open daily data provided by Protezione Civile

After more than two months of lock-down (from beginning of March to mid-May), just before the summer period measures to reduce contaminations were gradually relaxed and at beginning of September 2020 (6 months after the first case) crucial decisions were taken. Schools and any other education institutions, closed at the beginning of April, re-opened moving around 10 million people (including students, teaching staff and administrative/technical staff) while most of the public administration employees and part of private sector ones continued to work in remote mode. In the meantime the health system was enforced to address a possible "second wave".

15th October 2020


On 15 October occurrence of the second wave in Europe was no more an hypothesis and COVID19 cases and intensive care beds raised in Italy again (reaching respectively 99266 and 586 units) and other regions started to compete with the most affected regions of the "first wave" in terms of cases.

8 months after the first case (at the beginning of the second wave)

- COVID19 deaths (starting from 24th February) → 36,372.
- COVID19-occupied intensive care beds (on 15th October) → 586.
- COVID19 cases (starting from 24th February) → 381,602.



Saturation of the intensive care



Source: map and graph created by the authors eon elaboration of open daily data provided by Protezione Civile

15th November 2020.


On 15 November the overall situation worsened reaching the number of occupied IC beds and the number of deaths of the pick of the first wave.

9 months after the first case (at the pick of the second wave (?))

- COVID19 deaths (starting from 24th February) → 45,229.
- COVID19-occupied intensive care beds (on 15th November) → 3,422.
- COVID19 cases (starting from 24th February) → 1,178,529.




Saturation of the intensive care




Source: map and graph created by the authors eon elaboration of open daily data provided by Protezione Civile

The geographical scope: one of the main difference between the two waves

Looking at the number of occupied IC beds and the number of deaths of the two waves have the same shape. However, the geographical scope differently characterised the two waves.



Source: graphs created by the authors on elaboration of open daily data provided by Protezione Civile



Source: graphs created by the authors on elaboration of open daily data provided by Protezione Civile

A response to the second wave with an approach at regional level

A new combination of response and recovery measures were taken. A restriction approach at regional level was preferred to a national lock down. On 3rd November 2020 a Decree of the Presidency of the Council of Ministries applied the 21 indicators defined by the Ministry of Health (in the Decree of the Ministry of Health, 30 April 2020). The indicators (to be weekly updated with regional data) were grouped in three categories: Indicators related to monitoring capacity (6); Indicators related to COVID19 detection and contacts management capacity (6); Indicators related to contamination stability and response capacity of the health services (9).

Monitoring capacity (6)	COVID19 detection and contacts management capacity (6)	Contamination stability and response capacity of the health services (9)
1.1 # synthomatic cases reported in the month with the first day of synthoms / total # synthomatic cases reported in the month 1.2 # hospitalised cases (not IC) reported in the month with the hospitalisation date / total # hospitalised cases (not IC) reported in the month 1.3 # IC cases reported in the month with the IC date / total # IC cases reported in the month 1.4 # cases reported in the month with indication of the municipality of residence / total # cases reported in the month 1.5 # weekly checklist submitted to healthcare infrastructures (not mandatory) 1.6 # healthcare infrastructures answering to the weekly checklist with at least one critical issue (not mandatory)	2.1 % positive tests (excluding repetitions to the same inidviduals) in the month 2.2 Time lag between the first synthomatic day and the date of certification of the COVID19 case 2.3 Time lag between the first synthomatic day and the date of isolation (not mandatory). 2.4 Professional staff #, type and person/hours in contact-tracing 2.5 Professional staff #, type and person/hours in testing, lab analysis, contact tracing of first level and of cases in isolation/quarantine 2.6 # new cases identified with contact tracing of first level in the area / total # new cases in the area	3.1 # cases reported in the last 14 days to the Civil Protection 3.2 RT based on criteria defined by the Istituto Superiore di Sanità 3.3 # cases reported every week to the COVID-net monitoring (not mandatory) 3.4 # cases reported every day with certification date and the first synthomatic day 3.5 # outbreaks (2 or more connected cases or an unexpeted increase of # cases in an area) 3.6 # new cases with known transmission paths 3.7 # first-aid patients with COVID19 synthoms (not mandatory) 3.8 % of intensive care beds occupied by COVID19 patients 3.9 % of beds in healthcare structures occupied by COVID19 patients


Source: Decree of the Ministero della Salute (30 April 2020)

For each indicator were defined thresholds and critical values to allow a risk assessment based on algorithms taking into account four levels of the likelihood of contamination and four levels of impact on citizens' health. A risk matrix combining probability and impact supported the definition of possible scenarios.

Risk assessment procedure for the Italian regions

The algorithm for LIKELIHOOD* 1. In the last 5 days have been identified new COVID19 cases in the region? YES - NO □ **VERY LOW** Ω 2. Is there evidence of an increase of contamination (i.e. increasing # cases, RT>1 and/or increase #/size of outbreaks)? YES - NO □ LOW Ω 3. Is there evidence of a contamination path difficult to manage/ contain in an effective way with restriction measures at local level? YES - NO **MEDIUM** HIGH *answers based on evidence of a specific sub-set of the 21 indicators. The algorithm for IMPACT* 1. In the last 5 days have been identified new COVID19 cases of people aged >50 in the region? YES - NO = **VERY LOW** 2. Is there evidence of difficulties/saturation of the health services of the region? YES - NO LOW Ω identified been new outbreaks in retirement homes/hospitals/healthcare structures hosting vulnerable people? **MEDIUM** HIGH *answers based on evidence of a specific sub-set of the 21 indicators. **LIKELIHOOD** LOW **MEDIUM** HIGH **IMPACT VERY LOW** SCENARIO 1 - Contamination at local level (outbreaks) without relevant changes respect to the period July-August 2020 (RT above the threshold for limited periods LOW i.e. less than 1 month) SCENARIO 2 - Relevant and spread contamination but still manageble by the health **MEDIUM** system in the short-medium term (1<RT<1,25) SCENARIO 3 - Relevant and spread contamination affecting the response capacity and the reliability of the regional health system in the medium term (1,25<RT<1,5) HIGH SCENARIO 4 - Uncontrolled contamination posing at risk the response capacity and the reliability of the regional health system in the medium term (RT structurally and significantly >1,5)

Source: Ministero della Salute, Istituto Superiore di Sanità (2020)



Lessons learnt


Two main types of measures were taken to better address socio-economic challenges of the first wave: measures to reinforce the health system and measures to support citizens and enterprises that suffered from the COVID19 pandemics effects. The design and the implementation of such measures led to lessons learnt useful to understand how to face a possible second wave in a more effective way. Among those to reinforce the health system, the need: to define for emergency situations light/ad-hoc procurement procedures; to improve/increase the existing equipment for intensive care; to create an effective system to track contacts. From measures addressed to citizens and enterprises, the main lessons learnt were related to the imposition of restrictions where they are really needed to avoid negative side-effects, to the improvement/simplification of mechanisms/procedures to support from the economic point of view affected citizens and enterprises and to improvement of the societal digitalization.

A shortcoming in the COVID19 emergency management – The IMMUNI app for Contact Tracking

When two IMMUNI users (user A and user B) meet, terminal (e.g. smart phone) of user A issues an anonymous key via Bluetooth including a specific ID of the contact event together with an assessment of the distance between User A and User B. Terminal of User B behaves in the same way. Each of the two terminals stores the other user's key.

If later one of two users (e.g. User A) results a potential COVID19 case, his/her keys (together with a contamination factor) are uploaded on an ad-hoc central server. All the keys are regularly downloaded by the IMMUNI app of all the users.

All the IMMUNI users having stored keys generated by contact events with User A \rightarrow informed of a potential contact with a COVID19 case with a precise level of health risk ranging from 1 to 8 (the contamination factor is one of the elements defining the level of the health risk).



The arrival of the second wave and the experience gained with the first one gave important lessons to better address socio-economic challenges related to a new world with a persistent COVID19 threat. The Italian health system needs to address in the medium term an higher demand of specialized health staff (i.e. intensive care doctors) and to guarantee first aid/care also for the other/not COVID19 patients. Among lessons learnt for what can reduce the negative socio-economic effects for citizens and enterprises the need to improve the public urban transport system, to define medium-term incentives/strategies to support the economic recovery, to favour the green transition and societal revitalization of non-urban areas.

A shortcoming in the COVID19 emergency management – Procedures in urgency to find medical/health staff

- 24 October 2020: call for medical/health staff (1,500 units) and for administrative staff (500 units) to generally address the COVID19 emergency and to enforce the contact tracing.
- 18 November 2020: call for specialised medical/health staff (160 units) to address the COVID19 emergency in the Campania region.
- 20 November 2020: call for specialised medical/health staff (200 units) to address the COVID19 emergency to support regional health systems.



Source: Website of the Italian National Civil Protection (22 November 2020)

In general, the experience of the COVID19 pandemic leaves behind a new awareness of the pandemic risk and suggest a greater probability of occurrence respect to what was previously perceived. As a direct consequence of this new awareness, a more adequate perception of that risk will also settle among the population. This include new communication approaches to properly inform about the pandemic risk all the population (regardless e.g. age, cultural diversity, social status) and to fight against distorting effects of deniers/conspiracy theorists. New policies and new tools can be introduced to activate supervisory strategies at national/regional level in order to improve the resilience of the territorial system towards risks relating to the health sector. This can be done by intervening on the various phases of risk management, in particular on the central phases (prevention, mitigation, response) that divide the "ordinary times" from the management of moments of crisis (Emergency Management). Unlike other dramatic events (such as earthquakes, for example), pandemics can occur downstream of precursor phenomena which, although being weak and delocalized, can and must be recognized and taken out of the "health noise" in order to be identified and managed. This operation, if suitably coordinated at central level, will allow the adoption of warning measures, the in-depth analysis and, in the case, the definition of timely containment actions.

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- Webpage of the Ministry of Health collecting general information on COVID19 in Italy, http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/homeNuovoCoronavirus.jsp