

## ***EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL PROTECTION MECHANISM: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES***

**C. Morsut<sup>1</sup> and B.I. Kruke<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> *Postdoc Fellow, Centre for Risk Management and Societal Safety, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway*

<sup>2</sup> *Associate Professor, Centre for Risk Management and Societal Safety, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway*

*Email: claudia.morsut@uis.no, bjorn.i.kruke@uis.no*

### **ABSTRACT :**

Security is affected by a series of threats and emergencies all over Europe and beyond its borders. In this respect, the European Union (EU) has contributed to broaden the notion of security, mainly anchored in national foreign policy and defence, now pursued in a framework of cooperation and solidarity among EU member states and associated countries to respond to any societal threat inside and beyond the European borders. In particular, the EU has increasingly widened its capabilities in civil protection since the establishment of the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism in 2001. The Mechanism has become a useful tool for emergency response not only inside the EU borders, but also worldwide. Using a qualitative methodology, that includes policy paper analysis and semi-structured interviews, this paper aims to explore the governance of the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism in the Mechanism's contribution to reliable crisis response. Indeed, the Mechanism offers new possibilities for the EU as security actor, but at the same time, it raises some governance challenges. This paper identifies two challenges that may jeopardise the reliability of the Mechanism's crisis response. On the one side, the internal Mechanism's coordination; on the other side, the deepening of the levels of cooperation between the Mechanism and recipient countries and within the multilateral context (mainly the United Nations, but also humanitarian actors, such as the International Red Cross and INGOs).


### **KEYWORDS:**

European Union Civil Protection Mechanism, reliability, governance.

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

Very few EU policies have received as high consensus among EU citizens as the EU civil protection policy. The last Eurobarometer shows that EU citizens strongly support the EU coordination of civil protection activities and believe that there are benefits in helping each other when a disaster occurs, recognising that crises are in increasingly transboundary (88% of the poll participants) (Eurobarometer 2015). Very few EU citizens (37% of the poll participants) believe that their countries have sufficient means to deal with major disasters, while 80% say that coordinated EU actions would be more effective than actions undertaken by individual countries (ibidem).

The Lisbon Treaty has recognised civil protection as a formal policy area (art. 196), which advocates an integrated approach to disaster management and, since 2001, the EU has increasingly widened its capabilities in civil protection through the (European) Union Civil Protection Mechanism. Until 2010, civil protection was under the responsibility of the DG Environment. It was then transferred to the DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) in view of better exploiting synergies and reinforcing the coherence of EU response operations. The Mechanism has become a useful hub for emergency response not only inside the EU borders, but worldwide. The main task of the Mechanism is to enhance a better coordination among the participating states to respond to major emergencies. By pooling the civil protection capabilities of the participating states, the Mechanism can contribute to a better protection of people, natural and cultural environment, critical infrastructure, increasing, at the same time, the cooperation among states. The EU does not dispose of all the relevant equipment and assets that national civil protections possess and needs to rely on the contributions from



the Mechanism participating states<sup>1</sup>.

This paper aims to explore the governance of the (European) Union Civil Protection Mechanism in the Mechanism's contribution to reliable crisis response. By exploring the concepts of crisis governance and reliability, this paper will present the features of the Mechanism in order to debate to what extent they contribute to reliable governance during a crisis response. Studies on civil protection highlight that the EU capacity to assist an affected country in the coordination of international response depends on the participating states' willingness to provide modules and teams to the Mechanism (Hollis 2010; Ekengren et al. 2006). In addition, the type of crisis and, in particular, its speed of development, size and predictability, influence the extent and the complexity of the response preparedness (Kruke and Morsut forthcoming). Further, the requesting states (both participating states and other states) may have different needs' specifications due to the lack of knowledge of the Mechanism's dynamics and the requirements of the requesting state on who is actually in charge.

This paper draws on qualitative methodology that includes policy paper analysis and semi-structured interviews and is divided in the following parts: first we briefly describe the main feature of the Mechanism; secondly we introduce our conceptual framework; thirdly we seek to answer questions related to the features of the Mechanism, like: are the Mechanism's modules relevant for the crisis response? Is the Mechanism prepared for unpredictable and fast developing crises?


## 2. THE MECHANISM

The Mechanism has a relatively long institutional development (see Morsut 2014) since it was established by the 2001 Council Decision (Council 2001). Revisions in 2007 (Council 2007) and in 2013 (European Parliament and Council 2013), together with Commission Decisions (Commission 2003, 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2014) contributed to the Mechanism's expansion, with the features of nowadays. According to the so called new EU Civil Protection legislation - consisting in the European Parliament and Council Decision (European Parliament and Council 2013) and the Commission Implementing Decision (Commission 2014) - the main goal of the Mechanism is 'to strengthen the cooperation between the Union and the Member States and to facilitate coordination in the field of civil protection in order to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing, preparing for and responding to natural and man-made disasters' (Commission 2014). The new legislation aims to 'ensure more effective, efficient and coherent disaster management in the years to come' (Commission 2014a) with a stronger focus on prevention and preparedness. The Mechanism is under the responsibility of the DG ECHO and its main features are: the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)<sup>2</sup>; the European Emergency Response Capacity (EERC); the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) and the Training Programme.

The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) was established in May 2013, as a successor of the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). It is the operational heart of the Mechanism, since it guarantees 24/7 operational capacity and serves the participating states and the Commission in reaching the objectives of the Mechanism. As a single entry point for information and coordination, the ERCC provides operational support, integrated situational awareness and analysis for the coordination of operations. Its key assets are: the capacity to deal with several simultaneous emergencies in different time zones; to monitor hazards 24/7; to collect and analyse real-time information on disasters; to prepare plans for the deployment of experts, teams and equipment; and to work with participating states to map available assets and coordinate the EU's disaster response efforts by matching offers of assistance to the needs of the affected country. The European Emergency Response Capacity (EERC) consists of a voluntary pool of pre-committed capacities from the participating countries in the form of modules, other response capacities and experts (experts trained in the framework of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism Training Programme). The Commission is responsible to define the types and the number of key response capacities required for the EERC (the so called capacity goals). The participating countries develop the modules on a voluntary basis since 2007. Modules can be made up of resources of one or more participating

<sup>1</sup> 28 EU member states in addition Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, and Serbia (33 participating states in total).

<sup>2</sup> The ERCC was inaugurated on 15 May 2013 and replaced the former Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC).



states according to the expertise of the national civil protections and they are made available for intervention upon request through the Mechanism. The new legislation lists 17 modules, like HUSAR (Heavy Urban Search and Rescue), WP (Water purification), HCP (High Capacity Water Pumping), FHOS (Field Hospital) and FFFP (Aerial forest fire fighting module using planes) (Commission 2014). The Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) is managed by the Commission and contact points from the participating states. Its main tasks are collecting information on a crisis, guaranteeing information sharing between the ERCC and the participating states contact points, disseminating information to the participating states and sharing lessons learnt from operations. Modules are registered in the CECIS. The Training Programme consists of training courses, simulation exercises and exchange of experts that cover crisis management in its prevention, preparedness and response phases. It aims at offering professional civil protection assistance worldwide. It is also a platform for experience sharing and networking between national experts from participating countries, where experts can learn first-hand about similar responsibilities under different national systems (Training Programme 2012).

The Mechanism is activated through the ERCC according to two slightly different procedures according to which country is affected by a crisis. Activation can take the form of an information message, information monitoring, early warning (or pre-alert) or request for assistance leading to deployment of teams and modules on the ground. When an EU member state is affected by a crisis or the crisis is imminent, the member state may request assistance (art. 15 Decision 1313/2013/EU). The affected state is responsible for directing assistance interventions by laying down guidelines and defining tasks to the modules or other response capacities. When the request comes from a country outside the EU (art. 16 Decision 1313/2013/EU), the assistance may also be requested through or by the UN and its agencies, or a relevant international organisation. The coordination is fully integrated with the overall coordination provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA).

Between 2007 and 2013, the Mechanism was activated 223 times, 72 operations were fulfilled, 246 experts and 64 liaison officers contributed to the operations. 132 activations regarded non-participating countries. The Mechanism was mainly activated for forest fires (24%), floods (23%) and earthquakes (13%) (ICF 2014). In 2014, the Mechanism was activated 25 times (15 requests, 3 pre-alert, 7 monitoring) for 16 natural disasters and 9 man-made disasters, 10 of which within the EU, while 15 outside its borders (ECHO 2015).

### 3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This paper aims to explore the reliability of the (European) Union Civil Protection Mechanism crisis governance. Before describing our conceptual framework on governance and reliability, few lines are needed about the terms crisis and disaster.

The sociologist Charles Fritz developed what has become a classic definition of a disaster, as ‘an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfilment of all or some of the essential functions of the society is prevented’ (Fritz 1961: 655). This definition of a disaster focuses on danger, disturbances, losses and challenges of maintaining essential functions of a system. A crisis is generically defined as ‘periods of upheaval and collective stress, disturbing everyday patterns and threatening core values and structures of a social system in unexpected, often unconceivable ways’ (Rosenthal et al. 2001: 6). Other central crisis characteristics are time pressure, highly uncertain circumstances, critical decision-making and unexpected scenarios and challenges. Crises and disasters often unfold because unexpected events happen. Crisis and disasters may be distinguished due to the degree of deviation from normal response patterns and resource availability (Quarantelli 2000). However, in this paper we will not distinguish between the terms disaster and crisis.

Crises present three main phases corresponding to crisis management activities (Kruke 2012):





Figure 1 Three-crisis phase circle (Kruke 2012)

Crisis prevention and preparedness are the main activities in the pre-crisis phase, forming the foundation for our crisis response in the acute crisis phase. A main activity in the post-crisis phase will be the lessons learned to increase our capacity for prevention and preparedness for the next crisis.

What is then crisis governance?

### 3.1. Crisis Governance


Governance is a very broad concept and the scholarship offers a wide array of definitions, which are slightly different according to who exercises governance, on what/whom and in which circumstances.

Traditionally government refers not only to a set of institutions (for example, as the “governing community,” “governors,” etc.), but also to the manner or outcome of governing (“good/bad government”) and even the activity or process of governing (covered more specifically under the heading of “steering”). It is fair to say that governance has meanings overlapping with those of government. Governance, according to Rhodes (1996), signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed.

Stoker perceives governance as a framework for understanding changing management processes. He presents five complementary governance terms (Stoker 1998):

- Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors;
- Governance blurs boundaries and responsibilities;
- Governance identifies power dependences between institutions and actors involved in collective actions;
- Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors;
- Governance recognises that there is an ability to get things done, which is not dependent on the ability of government organisations to exercise power, but government institutions are able to adopt new management tools and techniques.

Governance is therefore a process of management and of managing, for instance, a crisis. Crisis governance is thus strongly related to management and coordination of crisis response and embraces Stoker’s five ways to describe governance *per se*. The crisis management and coordination is traditionally the responsibility of public organisations, such as ministries, civil protection agencies, police forces, fire departments, ambulance services and, in certain circumstances, armed forces. Governance is, however, not limited to public actors, but may also be a result of cooperation and mutual influence between private and public actors (Kooiman 1993) and also volunteers. The involvement of several actors may blur the lines of responsibility, but may also increase the potential for reliability in crisis governance, since actors are dependent of each other to manage a crisis and



therefore need to cooperate to solve it. According to Bogason, governance involves less focus on formal organisational structures and more on actual interaction patterns (Bogason 1996). These interaction patterns contribute to new forms of governance and governance structures, where decision making is conducted in a framework of institutional diversity consisting of more traditional public organisations, as the ones mentioned above, trade associations, NGOs, international organisations (as the EU) as well as public authorities, implying a change in management basis and in government (Rhodes 1996). In this paper we define crisis governance in terms 'the extent to which the relationships among economic and political, formal and informal institutions are able to manage crises' (Kruke and Morsut forthcoming). We argue that good governance in crisis management is foremost good coordination among several intervening interdependent actors. Coordination assumes different dimensions according to which actors are involved. In the case of the Mechanism, ECHO needs to take account a challenging multilevel governance system of coordination: between the Mechanism and the Mechanism's participating states, between the participating states and the affected countries, between ECHO and the UN or other organisations on the ground, just to mention the few.

What is then reliable crisis governance?

### ***3.2 Reliability and Reliable Crisis Governance***

The term reliability is anchored in different scientific disciplines (see Kruke and Olsen 2005; Aven et al. 2004; Hollnagel 1993; Hannan and Freeman 1984). In hard sciences, the term is often used within calculation and analysis through mathematical, statistical and physical models. In social sciences, the term explains how organisations are able to reproduce a collective outcome or a product of a given quality repeatedly (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Hollnagel (1993) describes reliability as the lack of unexpected, unforeseen and unexplained variations in system performance. The social science understanding forms the basis for how we comprehend reliability in this paper. The system performance we are interested in is, indeed, the Mechanism.


In a normative perspective, the term reliability may be used to measure the quality of the crisis preparedness activities (e.g. the accuracy and relevance of planning, resource allocation and training of crisis response structures), and the quality (timely and relevant) of acute crisis response. The governance of a crisis is of paramount importance, since good/bad crisis governance by the response organisations influences the reliability of the overall response. Two issues emerge from this.

First, reliable crisis governance is not conducted without government. Reliable crisis governance is a joint effort. We argue for reliable crisis response through multilevel governance inside a prepared, planned, trained and equipped structure in the pre-crisis phase. Indeed, there is a clear link between preparedness activities in the pre-crisis phase and the quality of the crisis governance response in the acute phase of a crisis, since a reliable crisis governance response rests on reliable preparedness activities. Second, reliable preparedness considers both the most relevant crisis scenarios we should be prepared to handle, and also the unexpected scenarios. As described above, crises and disasters unfold because unexpected events happen.

Measuring crisis governance reliability is an issue of whether the planned preparedness will actually work properly when it is needed. Most measurements come from testing in training and exercises. But, the ultimate test will be the deployment in a real crisis.

## **4. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION**

In this part of the paper we aim to analyse and discuss the main features of the Mechanism described above (focus here on the Emergency Response Coordination Centre ERCC; the European Emergency Response Capacity EERC; and the Training Programme) according to a reliable crisis governance perspective. We base our analysis on official documents published in the ECHO website and on semi-structured interviews. In addition, we have chosen two response operations, one in which the requesting state is a Mechanism participating state (large floods - Poland in May 2010) and one where the requesting state is not member of the Mechanism (tropical cyclone Haiyan – Philippines 8 November 2013). The two cases helped us to better



illustrate the contribution of the Mechanism on the ground (reliable crisis response). For each feature of the Mechanism, we sought to find out whether there were shortcomings or challenges that ECHO was/became aware of and tried to improve or change to guarantee reliable crisis governance. For each response operation we wanted to underline the kind of assistance the Mechanism offered, the way it was offered and received, and which consequences this had for the affected country and for the Mechanism itself.


The evolution of the structure of the Mechanism reflects the EU goal to establish a system that should guarantee reliable crisis governance, but it is only when the crisis occurs and the Mechanism is activated that reliable crisis governance is *recognisable* in to what extent the relationships among formal and informal institutions are actually able to manage crises. However, the features of the Mechanism reveal, according to these policy documents and interviews, that the Mechanism has been built and developed to manage and coordinate the response in a reliable way. In general, in the Annual Reports sent by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (ECHO 2015a) and in the interviews (interview 1 and 2 2015), the Commission is fully aware that response needs to be immediate when a crisis occurs. In particular, in the 2013 Annual Report (Commission 2014a), the Commission recognises that crises are increasingly more frequent and happen unexpectedly. This is the main reason of significant changes in the legislation, with significant improvements in the EERC (see below) and the inclusion of prevention and preparedness in the new legislation (interview 1 2015).

In general, the Annual Reports do not use the term reliable to describe the Mechanism crisis governance; rather they present it in terms of timely, effective (coordination), rapid, accountable, and efficient to describe the Mechanism response to a crisis. The same terminology is present in two ex post external evaluations of the Mechanism delivered by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: one focuses on the period 2007-2009 (COWI 2010); the other one on the period 2007-2013 (ICF 2014). The interviewed as well were more discussing the Mechanism operations in terms of ‘quick response, effective and collective action’ (interview 1 2015) or ‘efficiency of disaster responses’ (interview 2 2015).

The external evaluation, dated December 2010 (COWI 2010) on the period 2007-2009, focuses on criteria such as relevance, effectiveness, coherence, coordination and complementarity (the 3Cs). The second one (ICF 2014) uses almost the same criteria (relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and EU added value) to assess the Mechanism in the period 2007-2013 and concludes that ‘the Mechanism was effective in achieving its overarching and specific objectives. Mechanism actions responded to stakeholders’ needs, were cost effective and were in the majority of cases implemented efficiently’. Reliability is not explicitly mentioned, but the criteria used help understanding the efforts made by ECHO to guarantee a high standard of crisis governance.

Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC): The main shortcoming of the MIC – lack of 24/7 coverage - is addressed in the 2010 external evaluation as the only issue which needs to be improved. In general, the MIC is regarded as a central coordinator for the Mechanism and contributes to more effective disaster response, since it is able to channel important information in short time and contributes to avoid bilateral coordination that is considered time consuming. This has led to more effective response to crises. In the 2014 external evaluation, the “new” MIC (ERCC) is considered a valuable improvement that has answered the needs of stakeholders (24/7 coverage). 24/7 manning of the ERCC means the ability to respond much faster, regarding affected states’ initial needs, coordination of modules’ availability offered by the participating state, and continuous support to teams and modules deployed to the affected areas. Coordination has been improved and complementarity of assistance has found a common hub that helps avoiding overlapping and waste of time.

The European Emergency Response Capacity (EERC) modules: at the time of the first evaluation modules were a relatively new tool of the Mechanism, since they were introduced in 2007. Their introduction was considered an improvement in giving more coherence to the Mechanism, since modules have to guarantee a minimum standard and to respond to criteria set up by the Commission. In addition, modules could help a better coordination with the UN, which, at the time, had started a cluster approach to respond to crises. Some challenges were underlined in the 2010 evaluation: the modules included not only equipment, but also experts and their presence could slow down the response; experts on the ground were not always requested by the affected state; the modules were difficult to register since the participating countries have different




administrative procedures (some assets belong to the local level, some others to the central level); some participating countries wanted to deploy their modules, even if they were not necessary, to reach visibility; some affected states relied on bilateral cooperation and did not consider modules an important tool of intervention. The 2014 evaluation concluded that there was still room to improve the modules by a better standardisation, common guidelines and procedures. A way to overcome these challenges has been the introduction of the voluntary pool (new legislation), in the form of pre-committed different types of response capacities from the participating states to the Mechanism (interviews 1 and 2 2015). In this way, there is a sort of binding commitment between the country, which offers the module and the Mechanism, which has a guarantee to have a certain asset at disposal when it is needed.

Training Programme: the 2010 evaluation depicts the Training Programme as the most successful tool of the Mechanism due to its relevance to exchange information and skills between national experts, to reach a common standardised modus operandi and to enhance a stable network of experts. The EU is regarded as the biggest training provider, which aims at reaching effectiveness of response, since through the Training Programme, the EU is able to shape a common understanding of civil protection cooperation and to improve skills, know-how, competences, and response capacities of the participating states, the modules and civil protection experts. The 2010 evaluation stressed that the Training Programme should target more specific areas, like the modules, disaster risk management competences, cultural issues, inclusion of other actors belonging to NGOs and international organisations, like the UN. The 2014 evaluation, as well, describes the Training Programme the most evident contribution to a more effective response capacity, by shaping a common body of knowledge shared by all the participating states, but is not as critical as the 2010 evaluation.

These three components (ERCC, EERC and Training Programme) have contributed to many crisis, of which we have chosen two major crisis, one outside the EU borders (tropical cyclone Haiyan – Philippines 8 November 2013) and one inside the EU borders (large floods - Poland in May 2010). We do not aim to compare these two cases, but rather to discuss the reliability of the crisis governance of the Mechanism in two diverse crises (outside versus inside the EU; cyclone versus flood; affected country outside the Mechanism versus affected participating country).

On 8 November 2013 the typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines, resulting in heavy rainfalls, flash floods, landslides, disrupting up to 80% of infrastructure, family houses and commercial establishments up to 100 km from the epicentre of the typhoon. UN estimates concluded that, within the first twelve months, 577.4 million euro were needed for relief assistance and early recovery. Haiyan left over 6 200 fatalities, 4 million people displaced and affected between 14-16 million people (ECHO 2015b). The Mechanism was activated by the Philippine Embassy in Brussels on 10 November (48 hours after the crisis), but four ECHO humanitarian experts were already in Manila on 8 November and were continuously monitoring the situation and in contact with the UN, Red Cross, NGOs and the EU Delegation to the Philippines. On 12 November (48 hours after the activation), the first EU civil protection team (EUCPT), called Alpha, reached the Philippines. Team Alpha was deployed for ten days (12 - 22 November), followed by team Bravo for seventeen days and finally team Charlie was in the field for ten days (26 November - 6 December). In addition, on 27 November, a EUCP marine pollution expert joined a UNEP/OCHA mission responding to oil spill, for four weeks. Seven participating states deployed modules like two Advanced Medical Post (AMP), two Water Purification System (WPS), two Technical Assistance Support Team (TAST), and one field hospital (ICF 2014a). Two elements contributed to reliable crisis governance: the improvement of the ERCC, which was operational 24/7; the deployment of the relevant modules, which managed to link to each other with precious exchange of information. Obstacles experienced were mainly initial coordination challenges between the Mechanism teams and modules and the UN agencies, and the need for increased interaction between the Mechanism officials and humanitarian aid officials within ECHO (ICF 2014a).

The heavy rainfalls in Poland during May 2010 provoked large floods from 16 May, which caused 19 fatalities and affected more than 100 000 people. Poland activated the Mechanism three days later (19 May) with a clear request of ten high-capacity pumps, since the national capabilities were under pressure. Nine participating states responded to the request and Poland accepted the help from five, while three countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) formed a multinational rescue module called BaltFloodCombat (BFC). BFC was co-financed and



deployed directly by the Mechanism (ICF 2014b). In addition to the Mechanism's assistance, bilateral assistance was provided by Russia, Ukraine and the United States. This bilateral assistance was outside the coordination of the Mechanism.

Reliable crisis governance is an issue of whether the planned preparedness worked properly. In the Polish floods the Mechanism modules, the bilateral assistance and the formed BaltFloodCombat rescue module assisted the Polish civil protection authorities in the response operations. While the Mechanism modules and the bilateral arrangements were preplanned, the BaltFloodCombat module was formed for the occasion. Thus we experienced both preplanned and ad hoc initiatives in the response phase. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (the three countries of the BFC) are members of the Mechanism and therefore familiar with procedures, standards and training of Mechanism's modules. Several elements contributed to reliable crisis governance during the Polish floods: a clear and concise Polish request for assistance (Poland knew what was most needed and obtained it); preplanned, trained and equipped modules and teams from the Mechanism; an ad hoc multinational module (formed by three Mechanism participating states; bilateral arrangements; and Polish civil protection authorities professional in both reception of international teams, and in coordination of the overall response) (ICF2014b).


## 5. CONCLUSION

We consider the three main elements (focus on ERCC; EERC; Training Programme) of the Mechanism crisis preparedness activities, but, at the same time, these same three elements are applied as crisis response tools. The improvement of the Mechanism through the new legislation, in terms of ERCC and voluntary pool, increases the potential for reliability of preparedness planning and training, forming a good foundation for a reliable crisis governance during the response in an acute crisis. The more modules will be standardised and available before a disaster occurs, the more ECHO is in the condition to guarantee reliable crisis response. This standardisation is helped by the Training Programme as well, since all the participants in the Mechanism need to answer to the same requirements. The Training Programme is shaping a "common" civil protection language, which strengthens the coordination among the participants. In addition, the voluntary pool is guaranteeing easier access to stable resources. Already in the preparedness phase, ECHO knows which modules are available and which are not. Challenges for reliable crisis governance are related to the quality and availability of the requesting state's civil protection systems, increased cooperation with the international humanitarian system, both in the crisis area, but also within ECHO.

## REFERENCES

- Aven, T., Boyesen, M., Njå, O., Olsen, K.H. and Sandve, K. (2004). *Samfunnssikkerhet*, Universitetsforlaget. Societal safety (own translation).
- Bogason, P. (1996). *New Modes of Local Political Organizing: Local Government Fragmentation in Scandinavia*, Nova Science Publishers.
- Commission (2014), Commission Decision implementing Decision of 16 October 2014 laying down rules for the implementation of Decision No. 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism and repealing Commission Decisions 2004/277/EC, Euratom and 2007/606/EC, Euratom, 2014/762/EU.
- Commission (2014a), Final Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Annual Report on the European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their Implementation in 2013. COM(2014)537.
- Commission (2010), Commission Decision of 29 July 2010 Amending Decision 2004/277/EC, Euratom as regards rules for the implementation of Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism.
- Commission (2007). Commission Decision of 8 August 2007 laying down rules for the implementation of the provisions on transport in Council Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom establishing a Civil Protection Financial Instrument, 2007/606/EC, Euratom.





- Commission (2004). Commission Decision of 29 December 2003 laying down rules for the implementation of Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions, 2004/277/EC, Euratom.
- Commission (2003). Commission Decision of 29 December 2003 Laying Down Rules for the Implementation of Council Decision 2001/792/EC Euratom Establishing a Community Mechanism to Facilitate Reinforced Cooperation in Civil Protection Assistance Interventions, Reference No. 2004/277/EC.
- Council (2007). Council Decision of 8 November 2007 Establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism – Recast, Reference No. 2007/779/EC.
- Council (2001). Council Decision of 23 October 2001 Establishing a Community Mechanism to Facilitate Reinforced Cooperation in Civil Protection Assistance Interventions, Reference No. 2001/792/EC.
- COWI (2010). Final Report.
- ECHO (2015). [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en) accessed 20.07.15.
- ECHO (2015a). [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/who/accountability/annual-reports\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/who/accountability/annual-reports_en) accessed 20.07.15.
- ECHO (2015b). [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/philippines\\_haiyan\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/philippines_haiyan_en.pdf) accessed 27.07.15.
- Ekengren, M., Matzen, N., Rhinard, M. and Svantesson, M. (2006). Solidarity or Sovereignty? EU Cooperation in Civil Protection, *Journal of European Integration*, **Volume:28 Issue:5**, 457-476.
- Eurobarometer (2015). Europeans show strong support for EU civil protection policy. Press release.
- European Parliament and Council (2013). Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism.
- Fritz, C.E. (1961). Disasters, in R.K. Merton and R.A. Nisbet (eds.), *Contemporary Social Problems*, Harcourt Press, 651-694.
- Hannan, M.T. and Freeman, J. (1984). Structural inertia and organizational change. *American Sociological Review*, **Volume:49**, 149-164.
- Hollis, S. (2010). The national participation in EU civil protection, Acta B42, Swedish National Defence College.
- Hollnagel, E. (1993). *Human reliability analysis: Context and control*, Academic Press.
- ICF (2014). Ex-post evaluation of Civil Protection Financial Instrument and Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) 2007-2013. Final Report.
- ICF (2014a). Evaluation of Civil Protection Mechanism. Case study report – Philippines 2013.
- ICF (2014b). Evaluation of the Civil Protection Mechanism. Case study report - Floods in Poland 2010.
- Interview 1, 31.05.15. ECHO officer.
- Interview 2, 17.06.15. ECHO officer.
- Kooiman, J. (1993). *Modern Governance. New Government – Society Interactions*, Sage Publications.
- Kruke, B.I. and Morsut, C. forthcoming. Resilience in a Multilevel Crisis Governance Context: A tale of joint implementation of community, regional, national and EU response capabilities.
- Kruke, B.I. (2012). Societal safety and crisis management: Relevance for 22 July 2011. 22 July-Commission Paper 7/12.
- Kruke, B.I. and Olsen, O.E. (2005). Reliability-seeking networks in complex emergencies. *International Journal of Emergency Management*, **Volume:2 Issue:4**, 275-291.
- Morsut, C. (2014). The EU's Community Mechanism for Civil Protection: Analysing its Development, *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, **Volume:22 Issue:3**, 143-149.
- Quarantelli, E.L. (2000). Emergencies, disaster and catastrophes are different phenomena, University of Delaware Disaster Research Center (Preliminary paper 304).
- Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996). The New Governance: Governing without Government, *The Journal of Political Studies*, **Volume:44 Issue:4**, 652-667.
- Rosenthal, U., Boin, A. and Comfort, L.K. (eds.) (2001). Managing crises: threats, dilemmas, opportunities, Charles C. Thomas.
- Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as theory: five propositions, *International Social Science Journal*, **Volume:50 Issue:155**, 17-28.
- Training Programme (2012). The European Civil Protection Training Programme.