

The GB Electricity Transmission Network: Modelling, Monitoring and Mitigation

23 October 2012



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Severe Risk Analyst

Effects of Geomagnetic Storms

Impacts from geomagnetic storms are wide-ranging with potentially significant consequences.




Satellite Operations



Manned Spaceflight



Aircraft Operations




GPS



Power Grid Operations

Geomagnetically Induced Current

- Electric currents in Ionosphere
- Induce fields in Earth's crust
- If resistivity of ground is high
- GICs flow out of earth, along transmission lines
- Earth themselves again through transformer neutrals
- Slowly varying, quasi-DC currents




Effects on the system

- Magnetic flux leakage from core
 - Overheating, gassing, shutdown
 - Potentially catastrophic failure
- Distorted output waveform
 - Higher harmonics present
 - Protective relays triggered
 - Control assets switched out
- Increased reactive power consumption
 - Voltage instability




Jetstream Modelling

- Decide on severity of event:
 - 1 in 100 year storm
- Place jetstream in unfavourable position over UK




Geological Modelling


- Variations in geomagnetic field primarily produced by ionospheric currents
- Disturbances propagate down into earth – longer duration, greater the depth
- Layered conductivity model
- Down to depths of >500km



Transformer Modelling




Effect of DC on Transformer Cores



- Transformer specific
- Calculate magnetic flux paths
- Calculate hot spots
- Reactive Power consumption
- Production of harmonics

Network Modelling

- Represent transmission network in the model
 - England & Wales: 400 & 275 kV
 - Scotland: 275 & 132 kV
- Include Generator step-up transformers




Transformer Modelling


Unit	Lat	Long	Year	15	20	30	50	100	200
A1	51.1	-1.2	1996	L	L	L	L	L	L
A2	51.1	-1.2	1995	L	L	L	L	L	L
A3	51.1	-1.2	1996	L	L	L	L	L	L
A4	51.1	-1.2	1996	L	L	L	L	L	L
A5	51.1	-1.2	1995	L	L	L	L	L	L
A6	51.1	-1.2	1996	L	L	L	L	L	L
A7	51.1	-1.2	2008	L	M	M	M	H	H
A8	51.1	-1.2	2009	L	M	M	M	H	H
A9	51.1	-1.2	1967	L	M	M	M	H	H
A10	51.1	-1.2	2007	L	M	M	M	H	H
A11	51.1	-1.2	2006	L	M	M	M	H	H
A12	51.1	-1.2	2007	L	M	M	M	H	H
A13	51.1	-1.2	2008	L	M	M	M	H	H
A14	51.1	-1.2	2005	L	M	M	M	H	H
A15	51.1	-1.2	2005	L	M	M	M	H	H
A16	51.1	-1.2	2005	L	M	M	M	H	H
A17	51.1	-1.2	1994	L	M	M	M	H	H
A18	51.1	-1.2	1994	L	M	M	M	H	H
A19	51.1	-1.2	1994	L	M	M	M	H	H
A20	51.1	-1.2	2008	L	M	M	M	H	H
A21	51.1	-1.2	2008	L	M	M	M	H	H
A22	51.1	-1.2	2011	L	M	M	M	H	H
A23	51.1	-1.2	2008	L	M	M	M	H	H
A24	51.1	-1.2	2010	L	M	M	M	H	H
A25	51.1	-1.2	2010	L	M	M	M	H	H
A26	51.1	-1.2	2010	L	M	M	M	H	H
A27	51.1	-1.2	2010	L	M	M	M	H	H
A28	51.1	-1.2	2010	L	M	M	M	H	H
A29	51.1	-1.2	1978	L	M	M	M	H	H
A30	51.1	-1.2	1978	L	M	M	M	H	H
A31	51.1	-1.2	1978	L	M	M	M	H	H
A32	51.1	-1.2	1979	L	M	M	M	H	H
A33	51.1	-1.2	1979	L	M	M	M	H	H
A34	51.1	-1.2	1979	L	M	M	M	H	H
A35	51.1	-1.2	1980	L	M	M	M	H	H
A36	51.1	-1.2	1980	L	M	M	M	H	H
A37	51.1	-1.2	1980	L	M	M	M	H	H
A38	51.1	-1.2	2000	L	M	M	M	H	H
A39	51.1	-1.2	2007	L	M	M	M	H	H
A40	51.1	-1.2	2007	L	M	M	M	H	H
A41	51.1	-1.2	2000	L	M	M	M	H	H
A42	51.1	-1.2	1997	L	M	M	M	H	H
A43	51.1	-1.2	1994	L	M	M	M	H	H
A44	51.1	-1.2	1994	L	M	M	M	H	H
A45	51.1	-1.2	1994	L	M	M	M	H	H
A46	51.1	-1.2	1994	L	M	M	M	H	H

- Analyse over 1400 transformers on the high voltage network
- Classify risk by different design and year
- At different GIC levels
- Derive transformer-specific GIC to Risk function

GIC output




Risk output



- Based on GIC flow and design of transformers at each node
- For one extreme scenario
- Different scenarios produce different risk profiles


Reactive Power Requirement



- Simple model
- Calculates on basis of GIC flow and voltage
- Assumes all types behave in same way
- Only for one scenario
- Order of magnitude results only


Monitoring

- 18 October 2003




Sunspots for Halloween Storm

- 19 October 2003




Sunspots for Halloween Storm

- 20 October 2003




Sunspots for Halloween Storm

- 21 October 2003




Sunspots for Halloween Storm

- 22 October 2003




Sunspots for Halloween Storm

- 23 October 2003




Sunspots for Halloween Storm

- 24 October 2003




Sunspots for Halloween Storm

- 25 October 2003




Sunspots for Halloween Storm

- 26 October 2003




Sunspots for Halloween Storm

- 27 October 2003




Sunspots for Halloween Storm

- 28 October 2003




X-Ray burst from solar flare



Updated 2011 Feb 15 23:55:12 UTC

NOAA/SWPC Boulder, CO USA

CME arrival at ACE



Warning actions

- Day -4 onward
 - Monitor all available space weather sources carefully
- Day -1 Observe CME
 - Issue warning of possible system disturbance
- At T -30 minutes
 - Observe direction of Bz at ACE
 - Reissue warning of system disturbance


Operational Mitigation Options:

■ ALL IN:


- All circuits returned to service and switched in
- All Supergrid Transformers connected
- Substations run solid
- Extra generation instructed to synchronise
- Extra reactive support made available
- All monitoring and warning systems utilised

National Grid / BGS MAGIC Webtool Magnetometer records

nationalgrid



National Grid / BGS MAGIC Webtool nationalgrid Network Model display



GIC Monitoring



Cooperation for Cycle 24



Lancaster University
Manchester University
Cardiff University

NOAA
NASA
NERC (UK)
NERC (US)

National Grid UK
(4 SUNBURST sensors)
National Grid US
(2 SUNBURST sensors)



Scottish Power
DECC
Cabinet Office