# SESSION 3: Role of NGO in Emergency Management
# 议程三：非政府组织在应急管理中的角色

# 什么是阻止公司看待业务连续性作为社会职责

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【摘要】业务连续性管理（BCM）的可称为一个安全网；一个在遭受自然或人为灾害袭击的公司免于崩溃。但是，并非所有的公司都看到拥有业务连续性管理程序的价值或理解怎样称赞企业社会责任。许多人没有充分认识就其业务灾害的影响程度，消费者，客户，供应商，合作伙伴，雇员或周边社区。为什么？

建立在核心人类普遍恐惧（死亡，渺小，混沌，外界和对未来的恐惧），本届会议将使员工和管理以及应急和连续性从业员开始探索发现的旅程。用真实世界的企业例子，这个话题可以帮助审核和认识已经发展 BCM 程序组织的困难和如何忽略普遍的担忧，可以引起认识的缺乏，以及理解应急和持续管理。正是由于这些努力创造业务连续性管理（BCM）程序，它为那些已经建立的程序想知道为什么它是成功的。

业务连续性是关于人。

业务连续性是一种社会责任。

【关键词】社会责任；业务连续性管理（BCM）；人；保安；社区；尊重；权威；真理；明晰

# Heads in the Sand:
# What Stops Corporations From Seeing Business Continuity as a Social Responsibility

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**Keywords**

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Social Responsibility, Business Continuity Management (BCM), People, Security, Community, Respect, Authority, Truth, Clarity

## Abstract

Business Continuity Management (BCM) can be called a safety net; one that protects a company from collapse when hit by a natural or man-made disaster. But not every corporation sees the value in having a BCM program or understand how it compliments Corporate Social Responsibility. Many don't fully understand the level of impact a disaster has on its operations, customers, clients, vendors, partners, employees or its surrounding communities. Why?

Building upon core human universal fears - Death, Insignificance, Chaos, Outsiders and the Fear of the Future, this session will take employees and management as well as emergency and continuity practitioners on a journey of discovery. Using real world corporate examples, this topic helps examine and identify the difficulties organizations have with developing BCM programs and how ignoring the universal fears, can give rise to a lack of awareness and the understanding of emergency and continuity management. It is for those struggling to create BCM programs and it's for those with established programs that want to know why it isn't as successful as it could be.

Business Continuity is about people.

Business Continuity is a social responsibility.

## Resources

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## Introduction

A disaster at its fundamental core, whether it is a man-made or natural disaster has impact upon people; a disaster is about people one way or another. Even when a core technology component is offline and it affects the ability of an organization to operate, it's still impacting people; employees, vendors, suppliers, stakeholders, investors and customers. So it's imperative that organizations ensure they have appropriate plans and programs in place to address such situations. They require a Business Continuity Management (BCM) program and because people are involved, it's a social responsibility. Why?

Responsibility can be defined as *"having the capacity to make moral decisions"* while social can be defined as *"the life and well-being of human beings in a community."* When brought together, social responsibility is behaving in an ethical manner and performing business in a manner that supports and contributes to, the economic development, and improve the quality of life for its workforce, their families and the local community. If this is correct, then why don't all corporations have a BCM program? If an organization touts itself as being corporately responsible, then a BCM program must be in place to address that.

Still, many organizations that *do* have a BCM program – and are socially responsible – don't have a program that effectively addresses its needs. The program is missing a connection that could increase its effectiveness. Donald Brown, a professor emeritus at the University of Southern California, Berkley, in his book *Human Universals (1991),* described a list of universal commonalities throughout the history of Man across all civilizations. Ultimately, there were five universal traits that were common to all civilizations, regardless of geographic location, language, or religious or spiritual belief; a Fear of Death, a Fear of Outsiders, a Fear of Insignificance, a Fear of the Future and a Fear of Chaos.

It's ignorance of these fears that corporations are not recognizing and what they can do about it when it comes to their BCM programs.

- A Fear of Death equates to an Ignorance of Security.

- A Fear of Insignificance equates to an Ignorance of Respect.

- A Fear of Outsiders equates to an Ignorance of Community.

- A Fear of Chaos equates to an Ignorance of Authority.

- A Fear of the Future equates to an Ignorance of Clarity.

- Finally, many organizations have fear of the Truth, which even if they do know and understand, they will not accept.

For clarification purposes, ignorance is not used in a derogatory sense but rather in the sense of a *'lack of knowledge'* or *'understanding'* in specific areas. This paper will detail how the lack of knowledge and the ignorance of these universal fears, may be hindering corporations from establishing strong BCM programs and how they can increase their social responsibility.

**Ignorance of Security**

An Ignorance of Security incorporates the idea that all civilizations around the world have a Fear of Death – this isn't very surprising, as all people have a fear of death. Still, how can a strong BCM program help alleviate this fear and what components and considerations must be incorporated into it?

To reduce a person's fear of death and reduce the ignorance of security, a corporation must include such things as awareness, training, testing and exercising, facility security and have a supported health & safety program. Not only should this be part of the BCM program but these must be incorporated into the corporate culture. To illustrate the point, we'll look at two of these examples and explain how they can help BCM and ultimately, a persons' fear of death.

Physical or facility security refers to the building in which people perform the job functions. It's this facility that must feel safe for employees and visitors alike. If the facility isn't secure then it's open and easily accessible for anyone to enter. If the person is of an unsavoury type, this could mean the destruction of corporate property, the theft of corporate property and in extreme cases, the potential for employees to be harmed. It's unfortunate but there have been instances where jilted lovers or angry partners have entered their ex's workplace and caused harm. Employees want to feel secure within their offices and not work under the threat that others can enter their workplace and cause trouble.

If problems occur, then there is the chance that components of the BCM program would be activated because the security breach would cause a crisis. With BCM overlapping in many ways with Security protocols (both data security and physical security) there are processes that can be implement to minimize the potential for security failures to occur and increase an employee's level of protection.

One idea is to ensure that every person that enters the facility must sign in and receive a security pass or else they can't enter any area of the facility; in effect, they're stopped at the front door. It may seem simple but another strategy is to ensure that there are alarms place on all doors to the facility so that if any unauthorized person tried to enter the building, the appropriate security personnel will be notified and can investigate. This helps ensure that a person feel physically safe in their workplace.

In today's world, physical security isn't the only way a person needs to feel protected. Hackers and mischievous people will try to steal a person's identity so that they can acquire wealth and material possessions using someone else's credit cards or personal information. What an organization must do is ensure that they develop and maintain strong information security measures to prevent any outside source – or internal source – from accessing data they shouldn't have access to; data they don't require to enable them to perform daily activities. The threat of having your identity stolen can be fearful for people because it can cause a major disruption in their lives.

Another example is the establishing of a Health & Safety (H&S) program. As part of most Health & Safety program, there is a component where monthly inspections of the various areas of the facility are performed. If H&S members perform inspections, they can spot potential disasters before they occur. For example,

they may spot that a users workstation has many items plugged into a single outlet, which if overloaded can cause sparks and start a fire. Before you know it, you have a major fire destroying the building and suddenly disaster teams and alternate sites are activated. This would certainly make it easier on the BCM coordinator.

A BCM program should ensure that these protocols are implemented because not only are they needed during a 'disaster' situation but they are also required to be in place when operating out of alternate sites or in "DR" mode, let alone the fact that security breaches and H&S violations can cause a disaster. If this occurs, there must a link to the BCM program because now all the contingency strategies developed could be implemented. Executives that understand this will help employees – and customers and clients – feel safer and not fearful of their workplace.

### Ignorance of Respect

An Ignorance of Respect builds upon a Fear of Insignificance, where employees don't feel appreciated. They can feel as though they're spokes in a wheel rather than active and respected participants of the organization. Though many corporate vision and mission statements state that the number one aspect of the corporation is the workforce, employees have difficulty believing in this grand sentiment. This may be because they lack support programs - such as Employee Assistance Programs (EAP). Or they lack basic recognition for people's role in the company. There is even the lack of communication or understanding provided when organizations make changes and the habit of some management representatives to use their titles and designations to get things done, rather than showing respect and working with people to accomplish goals.

One of the simplest ways – yet often overlooked ways – is to show respect is to ensure the use of the words "please" and "thank you." These are two of the most under-utilized words in today's corporate world. Each day numerous small crises or operational incidents require a person or a team to investigate to ensure clients and customers aren't hampered by the incident. Yet, when management discover of the situation, the first thing stated is to get it fixed and the last thing said is usually something to do with how the crisis impacted the client. There aren't too many instances where management are saying 'thank you' to those that investigated and resolved the issue. This makes people feel undervalued because what they are doing is in fact, part of business continuity. They are investigating issues and then resolving them so that these incidents don't become full scale disasters.

Organizational change can cause all sort of issues for employees in their understanding of where the executive want to take the company – its new direction – and when that happens, the thought or changes required to the BCM program end up falling by the wayside. It's estimated that a majority of change initiatives fail an organization because of the lack of understanding by employees. This means the changes that are to take place aren't communicated effectively or that employees aren't part of the change. Instead, they are told what will happen and they are expected to know what is needed of them.

This is the same difficulty encountered by BCM. No one person in the corporation can ever know every process executed that enables it to deliver its products and services. Yet, when a disaster occurs, the corporation will turn to one or two people to make it happen. The reigns of responsibility are handed to someone who doesn't usually have the same level of responsibility on a daily basis. This isn't possible, even when a lone sole helps guide the BCM program, they can't simply take on all the responsibilities that exist within the corporation. To suddenly overload such a person shows a lack of respect because others – such as senior management – are offloading their responsibilities.

With a BCM program there must be specific roles and responsibilities to ensure that those who are knowledgeable in a role during normal operations – when things are running fine – are the same people responsible for those operations when disaster strikes. To take away those responsibilities and reassign them – either knowingly or by force – shows a lack of confidence in the people who perform the activities. Suddenly those people confident in their roles aren't good enough to perform the same responsibilities during a disaster. If there person with the skills and knowledge aren't good enough, who is? This type of activity shows a lack of respect for individuals who under normal circumstances are competent and fully able

to perform their role.

People want to feel important and apart of the corporation.  Having an Ignorance of Respect undermines the abilities of those who can help manage crises, contribute to the operations during a crisis or those that have managed crises in the past.

**Ignorance of Community**

An Ignorance of Community is just as it seems; it deals with communities and the universal fear of outsiders. An outsider, for the context of this paper, refers to internal and external communities that may or may not be directly influenced by an organization and its operations. Outsiders can also be those that are not part of a recognized group or society and may be viewed as 'strangers'; people and corporations that are trying to enter an established group or setting.

Business Continuity has a very unknown relationship here, as many in a community won't be concerned with a corporations BCM program until such time that the corporation experiences a disaster – or the community does.  Many corporations don't start to think about others - the community – until there are others to think about.  This means that some companies won't worry about what happens in "X" city until there becomes a need or desire to enter the market that "X" may represent.  Then the outlook will change and the corporation must embrace what makes the community special; it sees how it can benefit from the community and its citizens.

Within an organization, there are many groups of individuals with common interests that are brought together to intermingle in a way that has nothing to do with the company itself.  People can meet and find they have commonalities in areas such as a favourite musical group, common language, a favourite sports team or a hobby.  These create communities within an organization and can bring together from all over the organization, not just one specific department.  Senior management must be aware that these internal communities establish relationships amongst employees that can go beyond that of co-workers.

However, the biggest influence of communities is those that are external to the organization; such communities as Third Party Vendors and local citizenry groups.  Remember, that vendors are exactly that; "one who sells."  If an organization is doing business with a disaster recovery vendor, the vendor is trying to sell you something.  Even if the organization is seeking something specific – something the vendor may not have specifically aimed at what the organization wants – it is still going to try to sell something and corporations must be wary of this.  If the vendor didn't try to sell, they wouldn't be a vendor very long.

Sometimes a corporation doesn't know what it needs for its BCM program and a vendor may be on the outside looking in, wondering what it can sell to organization rather than fully understanding the need of the corporation.  The vendor may see the opportunity for itself and not worry too much about the client.  Now, not all vendors think this way.  In fact a majority don't, as most are honest and try to meet their clients' needs.  Still, if an organization doesn't understand that for any vendor the first priority is *their* corporation, *their* partners, *their* employees and *their* communities.  They have a social responsibility too, just as any company has and it will do what it needs to care for those people that keep its wheels turning.

If all corporations think this way, then all corporations will be taking care of themselves and those that surround it.  Doing this will help immensely with dealing with the fear of outsiders; in fact, if all corporations felt this way as taking care of themselves first – those they directly touch – then each corporation will have a strong sense of responsibility.  As many great leaders have said throughout history, *'you must take care of yourself first before you can take care of others.'*  Therefore, if a corporation takes care of its own interest first, it can then reach out and care for those it deals with.  Again, the fear of outsiders and the ignorance of community begin to fade and all people begin to work together.  If a corporation doesn't have anything in place the community can turn against the company because it will be seen as an irresponsible corporation and a pariah rather than a contributing and helpful corporate member of the community

**Ignorance of Authority**

An Ignorance of Authority incorporates the idea that people have a Fear of Chaos; something that can be attributed to dire BCM programs. A BCM program and the appropriate protocols can help replace chaos with stability, something that everyone strives for in their daily lives.

When a disaster occurs people feel threatened, scared and wonder what's going to happen to them and their families, especially if the disaster is a result of something occurring within their place of employment. When a disaster occurs, there needs to be people who have specific responsibilities assigned to them to ensure encountered issues are addressed and coordinated effectively. This comes down to leadership.

Leadership during a crisis is critical. You can compare it to a ship navigating the seas without anyone in the wheelhouse keeping the vessel on course. Without leadership the corporation won't be heading in the same direction and during a crisis, the corporation and all the people associated with it may not be performing activities at that are in the best interest of the company at that time. If no one sees or knows of a leader, then many people will make the mistake that nothing is occurring and will begin to vocalize it.

Good leaders will help bring organization and stability to what might often seem as insurmountable circumstances. A leader must stand in front of the media calmly – though not acting as though they don't care – and take responsibility for the action plans that need to be implemented and provide assurances to those affected by the disaster, that their well-being is first and foremost.

There are leaders that have been trained and see the necessity in having established plans and procedures in place to address crises. They understand that any circumstance requires decisive leadership skills and the ability to instil calmness in the most violent of storms.

Then there are leaders that don't believe in strong BCM programs but still believe they have the skills necessary to lead a corporation through a disaster. Often, these leaders play the 'blame game' and turn public opinion against the corporation yet, they don't understand why. There was an old cartoon character during the 1960's named Might Mouse, whose them song began with the line, *"Here I come to save the day,"* which would mean he was about to vanquish the villain and save those in distress. Bad leadership often produces the same results. Managers who don't support or contribute to a BCM program will suddenly run into a boardroom to *"save the day"* and believe they can manage the chaos, when in fact what they are doing – because of their lack of knowledge – is causing more issues, confusion and chaos for the organization. Its' this behaviour and thinking that will cause confusion and chaos for employees; they won't see a leader help them through a crises and will begin to wonder if they will ever get out of the bad situation – or even if they'll still have a job at the end of the day.

Those that take responsibility and ownership for their actions and stand up as leaders, have a better opportunity of gaining support from those affected by the corporation's situation and ensuring composure controls chaos.

**Ignorance of Clarity**

Ignorance of Clarity focuses on idea that people in the world have a Fear of the Future. The future is unknown and can't be predicted; no one has control of it and no corporation has control over its future, at least when it comes to unpredictable events such as disasters. BCM can help a corporation manage its future by ensuring that appropriate messages and responses are clear and concise, so as to be understood by everyone involved.

The largest component of clarity is communication, the cornerstone of any well-managed BCM program *and* corporation. Having strong communication between employees, managers and those on disaster teams will help the corporation work its way through a crisis. Communication must occur from the initial stages of a BCM programs' development right through to the end of a crisis – and beyond. Still, messages communicated aren't always effective as they could be. Crisis communication representatives must understand that messages aren't always received the same way by every person.

There are pitfalls associated with crisis communications that anyone responsible to disseminate information

must be aware of; this includes any communications associated with the BCM program.

One of the first pitfall is "mixed messages." This occurs when a message is placed on an employee phone line stating that a specific action is to be taken yet when a company executive or spokesperson stands before the media, they're saying something completely different. This only brings confusion to employees and ensures that the right message may not be getting to the right people.

A second issue can be that there are "too many messages" are distributed. Timing is everything; just ask any musician or sports enthusiast. A mere slip in timing can cause a race to be lost or a song to be played incorrectly. If a message is disseminated to employees providing them direction through the emergency phone line, such as notifying employee to call back in two (2) hour for an update, it would not make sense to send an update one (1) hour later. Many may not have received the first message and yet there is already an update so now there are more messages being distributed and only half the employee base is receiving them. Too many messages can cause people to be at different phases of the recovery process and some may even miss a messages that was specifically geared towards them because it was replaced by one message too many.

There are other examples and these are but only two ways to help make sense of the communications. Communications are a fundamental aspect that identifies good corporations from bad ones; how they communicate to employees, vendors and the surrounding community. When a disaster strikes, communications will provide a corporation the means to ensure positive public support, employee faith and media cooperation

**Ignorance of Truth**

This is an additional realm of ignorance; one that affects most corporations. As its name states, corporations are fearful of the truth; truth in findings and truth in reality. Ignoring the truth can be detrimental to the decision process and the decision made by corporations in building their BCM program and in their handling of a situation.

Truth must be found in the initial phases of a BCM programs' development through such things as a Risk Assessment/Analysis (RA) or a Business Impact Analysis (BIA). These analysis processes will identify what every department is responsible for, who and what is required to keep it operational, the required Recovery Time Objective (RTO) - *the amount of time allowed for the recovery of a business function or resource before it is required to be operational* - and internal and external dependencies. It will also tell an organization what the impact of a situation – snowstorm, fire, power outages etc – on the organizations employees, partners, vendors, processes, departments and even the community at large. Sometimes the findings will contradict what management 'feel' is important and when this happens, findings won't be acceptable and they may be changed to meet the expectations of management. When this occurs, management is denying the truth and manipulating the results to meet its own need.

For example, The findings can assist corporations identify where initial focus should be to keep the company functioning when disaster strikes and ignoring that fact won't change the impact on the company. Instead, management believe that a specific process or system is key to operations yet it may be that a non-critical or lesser known system is key to operations. This goes against the normal way of thinking so the finding from the BIA will be ignored and decisions will still be made in favour of the more 'well known' system – not the small, seemingly insignificant one.

Often, decisions will be made on the number of employees that utilize or contribute to a process but the truth may be that just a couple of people are the key players, for without them an entire process may come to a screeching halt. The findings conflict with what management perceive as the core mission of the corporation. This is understandable but the findings will depict what the various department see as what's important to the company. This often highlights the difference in thinking between those in the boardroom and those working the front lines.

Finally, there is the fact that many organizations ignore the real events. Throughout time, disasters have

occurred and will continue to occur. Many believe that a disaster or crisis of some sort will only occur to others. Disasters or crises can be learning opportunities for corporations in two ways. A corporation on the 'outside' of a crisis can watch and be mindful of the pros and con's that a competitor goes through when it is experiencing a situation. The corporation experiencing a disaster may do the right thing but they may also do some wrong things, all of which can be learning opportunities for other companies.

The truth is that a disaster will occur and sometimes the findings from a BIA may open up areas that don't want to be addressed by executives. However, facing the truth and all it can bring can actually enhance a BCM program and ensure that is focusing in the right areas, rather than crossing fingers, guessing and assuming that everything will unfold as expected.

**Conclusion**

Any disaster in the world regardless if it's manmade, a natural catastrophe and regardless of the situations size, scope and impact, it will have a strong blow upon people. People are at the core of every disaster. People develop the restoration and recovery plans and strategies and its people who need to practice and question those same plans to make them robust, scalable and adapt to disaster situations. It's people who will see friends and families and colleagues lose jobs and possibly more if there is no appropriate strategy or response mechanisms plans in place to aid them. If corporations state they are socially responsible, then it's by definition that a BCM program must be part of the corporate culture.

How can a corporation state proudly that it is socially responsible yet not have a BCM program in place? On one had its stating that as a responsible corporation it is committed to the well-being of employees, their families and the community in which it does business. Yet, on the other hand, it is not setting up appropriate BCM programs or strategies to deal with disaster situation, which affect the very people it is caring for in the opposite hand.

People have fears, noted in the universal fears described in this paper. Even executives, no matter how they may deny it, have the same fundamental fears as the rest of society. Those is senior executive positions are people long before they ever become a President or a Chief Information Office. Not title or designation will ever take away the basic fears that all societies have.

Protecting people from these fears is building comfort levels that support individuals and communities when times are tough; when catastrophic situations occur and people and their surroundings are impacted. Gaining ignorance from these fears is a result of not wanting to face them; not wanting to face the fact that a disaster will occur to a corporation – any corporation. Throughout history, there have been all sorts of disasters and there is no reason to believe that they will suddenly stop and companies can suddenly be free of crisis, disaster, small daily incidents or large catastrophic events. History shows the business world otherwise.

To be socially responsible a corporation must admit to itself that at some point – either tomorrow, next month, next year or even longer – a disaster will touch its operations. Depending on how it prepares for the eventuality, the situation can escalate out of control – instilling fear and panic in people and the surrounding communities – or it can become something to stand against; something that can show the business world and the general public, how prepared it is.

A BCM program doesn't just solidify the responsibility a corporation has *towards* the fears, hope and dreams of its surrounding and partnered communities, it ensures that the social sphere – the community itself – sees the corporation as addressing its fears and insecurities and seeing it as a trustworthy, caring and significant member of the community.

Throughout this paper, there have been examples of key components of a BCM program that can be utilized to address social fears and how addressing those social fears can help build a socially responsible corporation. Business continuity isn't just about ensuring that technology components are available at all times, it's also about ensuring that the responsibility for the social aspects of the corporation – the people and communities – are always first and foremost on the minds of every corporate leader.

Business Continuity *is* people.

Business Continuity *is* a social responsibility.

## Author Biography

Alex Fullick has been helping major Canadian organizations initiate and manage customized Business Continuity Management (BCM) programs for over 15 years.   He is the Founder and Managing Director of Stone-Road Inc., a consultancy and training firm specializing in BCM.   Alex is routinely asked to speak at various global BCM conferences such as the "BCM Symposium 2009" London, UK and "Continuity Insights Conference" Phoenix, AZ.

Alex's recent book called "Heads in the Sand" is a helpful manual with tips and advice for hesitant companies who want to develop a BCM program in order to quickly respond to disaster, but don't know where to start, or have fears about launching such a multi-faceted program.

Alex is a member of the Business Continuity Institute, earned his Certified Business Continuity Professional status with the Disaster Recovery Institute, and was recently awarded his Certified Business Resiliency Auditor designation.

Alex resides in Guelph, Ontario and is currently hard at work on his next book. He can be reached at alex@stone-road.com.

# 海外公民大规模危机事件中的外事应急管理政府协调

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【摘要】应对大规模外事突发事件已成为各国政府所必须具备的能力。外交部门在大规模恐怖袭击、自然灾害或者政治动乱等事件中帮助本国公民时所面临的期望和压力都在逐步增长。本文针对澳大利亚、瑞典和英国的外交部门在应对三次大规模外事突发事件中所面临的挑战，采用"结构化和重点化"的方法开展了案例对比研究。主要研究问题是政府部门在涉及多国和多机构的背景下，在面临时间压力、不确定性、公众期望高、媒体高度关注以及本国公民遇到生存威胁等情况下，能否开展有效的内外协调？本文明确提出了政府部门在协调方面所面临的许多挑战，填补了外交事务应急管理学术文献方面的空白，可为突发事件应急管理相关人员（包括外事响应人员）提供参考。

【关键词】领事事务；外交部门；协调；合作

# CONSULAR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT GOVERNMENT COORDINATION DURING LARGE-SCALE CRISES INVOLVING CITIZENS ABROAD

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## Keywords

Consular Affairs, Foreign Ministries, Coordination, Cooperation

## Abstract

The ability to respond to large-scale consular emergencies has become a necessity for governments. There is increasing expectation and pressure on foreign ministries to assist citizens in the event of a large-scale terrorist attack, natural disaster, or incident of political unrest abroad. Taking a 'structured and focused' comparative case study approach, this paper considers the challenges faced by the foreign ministries of Australia, Sweden and the UK in responding to three large-scale consular emergencies. The central research question is: can governments coordinate internally and externally in a multi-agency and multinational setting that is marked by significant time pressures, uncertainty, high public expectations, a bright media spotlight,

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and external threats to their own citizens? This research paper identifies a number of coordination challenges governments face; makes a contribution in addressing the gap in the academic literature on consular affairs and emergency management; and is of relevance to practitioners managing incidents that include a consular response element.

## 1. Introduction

Two hundred-and-two individuals died in the 2002 Bali bombings, more than 150 were foreign nationals. In 2004 the Indian Ocean tsunami struck the shores of a dozen countries but more than 40 countries lost nationals who were in the area. In 2006 the outbreak of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict required evacuation of more than 100,000 foreign citizens from Lebanon. The ability to respond to large-scale consular emergencies has become a necessity for governments. In the event of a large-scale terrorist attack, natural disaster, or incident of political unrest abroad, there is increasing expectation and pressure on foreign ministries to assist citizens rapidly and effectively. This paper considers how, with what mechanisms and with whom governments coordinate and cooperate in a consular emergency, and asks: can governments coordinate internally and externally in a multi-agency and multinational setting that is marked by significant time pressures, uncertainty, high public expectations, a bright media spotlight, and external threats to their own citizens? Through case comparison methods, the paper considers pros and cons of various types of crisis coordination mechanisms employed by Australian, Swedish and British authorities during recent major consular emergencies, and a number of recurrent challenges are identified.

## 2. Theory and Method

A range of literature in the fields of emergency management and public administration acknowledges the difficulty of interdepartmental and intergovernmental coordination (see especially, Drabek, 1985; Mushkatel and Weschler, 1985; Tierney, 1985; Rosenthal et al., 1991; Schneider, 1992; Granot, 1997; Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997; Hillyard, 2000; Boin et al., 2005; Kapucu, 2006; Waugh and Streib, 2006; Drennan and McConnell, 2007; Hicklin et al., 2009), including the problems of crisis coordination and cooperation at a supranational level (see especially, Wagner, 2003; Olsson, 2009). Coordination and cooperation are key elements in any emergency response, but these terms have a variety of meanings in the academic or theoretical study of emergency management. This study applied broad usage of the terms, namely that coordination is the organisation or integration of two parties' operations to augment and improve the response. Cooperation implies responding parties working in mutual assistance when appropriate, but without active integration of operations. Nonetheless, this study recognises that distinctions between coordination, cooperation, coercion, collaboration, contracting, competition and conflict may be blurred in practice. The discussion of consular affairs in the political science and diplomacy literature often focuses on small-scale incidents or cases of individuals (Melissen and Heijmans, 2007; Fernandez, 2008; Porzio, 2008). Consular emergencies are used as single case studies, although occasionally discussed as a concept (for example, Roach and Kemish, 2006; Lindström and Olsson, 2009; Schwarz and McConnell, 2009). Many of these also focus on crisis communication (for example, Kivikuru, 2006; Strömbäck and Nord, 2006; Brändström, Kuipers and Daléus, 2008).

This study utilised a 'structured and focused' comparative approach (see George and Bennett, 2005, especially pp. 67-72). Three foreign ministries' consular responses to three large-scale events were considered. The final death toll from the Bali attack on 12 October 2002 included 88 Australians, more than 20 Britons and six Swedes. On 26 December 2004, more than 20,000 Swedes, 10,000 Britons, and 5,000 Australians were in areas hit by the tsunami. Among the dead were nearly 550 Swedish citizens, more than 150 British citizens and 26 Australian citizens, with countless more injured. On 12 July 2006 Hezbollah forces kidnapped two Israeli soldiers. The subsequent Israeli offensive threatened the safety of those remaining in Lebanon, including an estimated 25,000 UK citizens, 20,000 Australian citizens, and 7,000 Swedish citizens, and led to some of the largest mass evacuations of recent history, which included approximately 15,000 Britons, 7,000 Swedes and 5,000 Australians.

The study focused on five main areas where coordination and cooperation (or lack thereof) impacted on the effectiveness of the consular response: within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); with citizens and the public – both in the affected country and at home; coordination between departments within a government; with the government of the directly impacted countries (the 'host' government); and between the governments of the responding countries. For reasons of space the paper does not address all the various actors and organisations with which the government may interact, such as NGOs, the UN, volunteers, community and lobby groups, private industry, or the news media. The five areas covered by this paper were selected to allow for a focus on government and its primary stakeholders in a consular emergency – its affected citizens. Despite the 'comparative' approach, this paper does not seek to assess or rank the relative 'success' or 'failure' of a government's response, but rather, examine the methods employed to handle challenges, such as evacuation, location of missing, assisting injured, supporting relatives, or identification and repatriation of the deceased. Empirical material was drawn from government and independent incident inquiries and reviews, annual reports, parliamentary hearings, and interview transcripts. This was supplemented with academic and news articles by first responders and government officials, as well as contemporaneous news media reporting.

## 3. Results and Discussion

### 3.1 Coordination within the foreign ministry

An effective consular response requires coordination between foreign ministries' headquarters and its representatives abroad, such as the Head of Mission (ambassadors and consuls-general) and mission staff in the affected country and broader region. If there is a mission in the affected country then the department already has knowledgeable people on-the-ground and an established base to lead the in-country coordination. However, missions invariably operate day-to-day business with few staff. For example, Australia's embassy in Lebanon was the workplace of five Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) employees when the conflict erupted, two of which were not in Lebanon at the time (Nicholson, 2006b). Widespread events can eclipse even the largest of embassy staffs. As the Australian prime minister pointed out after the tsunami, 'if you had 5,000 people in one spot you could do an evacuation, but they're scattered all over a vast region covering tens of thousands of kilometres' (Howard interview transcript, 2004).

Ambassadors and consuls-general are the highest-level representation in a region, and the public expect these representatives to be key sources of information. A speedy reaction is commended and symbolically important, for example, when the Australian consul-general in Bali was at the main bombsite within an hour (DFAT, 2003, 126). The need to react and seek information (particularly if moving into an area where communication may be poor) needs to be balanced with the responsibility of ensuring that the mission remains functional, especially as it becomes an information hub during emergencies. For instance, the day the tsunami struck, the British Ambassador to Thailand departed Bangkok for Phuket with other embassy staff in a four-wheel-drive convoy (NAO/FCO, 2005, 11). But when the London emergency call centre faltered the following day, the reduced staff at the Bangkok embassy was suddenly inundated with calls and emails from distressed citizens in Thailand and the UK. The embassy received nearly 6500 calls, which needed to be 'logged, sifted and actioned'. Because of this, some emails were not opened at all that day, including pleas for help from the badly hit region of Khao Lak (NAO/FCO, 2005, 12).

Individuals or specialist teams from the foreign ministry can usually be deployed to the mission and affected region. However, as emergencies often produce an insecure situation, safety is an important factor that can hinder the arrival of reinforcements. In 2006, even though the Swedish foreign ministry quickly established that there was a need to send reinforcements for the consulate in Beirut, there remained serious concerns about the 'security situation' (MFA Sweden, 2006, 7). Unsurprisingly, deploying reinforcements is easier with geographic proximity. The Swedish embassy in Jakarta sent staff to Bali on the first flight of the day after the bombings (Brändström and Örtenwall, 2007, 83), and within 24 hours, DFAT had deployed nine representatives from Canberra and Jakarta to assist their consulate (Burgess, 2002, 6). Lack of proximity was a hindrance in reinforcing staff during the Lebanon conflict. Australian Ambassador to Lebanon explained

that it took days to send assistance as suitably qualified staff needed to be found to assist with the operation and then travel for 24 hours to reach Lebanon (Schwarz and McConnell 2009, 243).

The unique nature of each event, including trigger and geography, can delay deployment until the foreign ministry knows what resources are required. This is where the introduction of scout and reconnaissance teams can be useful. In the UK, Rapid Deployment Teams (RDT) are a group of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officers 'with relevant skills, who are on standby in London and available to travel anywhere in the world at short notice in the event of a crisis' (NAO/FCO, 2005, 14-5). Although these teams can be sent within hours of a disaster, this does not eliminate the problem of knowing which area to prioritise or how to integrate the RDT into the existing on-the-ground foreign ministry structure. On 26 December 2004, one team was on standby in London and a swift decision was made to send it to Sri Lanka. Although the FCO had good reason early on to send the team to Sri Lanka, they were later criticised because it soon emerged that Thailand had a substantially larger need for reinforcements, which did not arrive from London until two weeks after the tsunami (NAO/FCO, 2005, 15). When the RDT arrived in Sri Lanka, embassy staff did not understand the role of the RDT and where it fitted into the command and control structure (i.e. as support rather than to 'take over'). There were communication breakdowns as the RDT worked independently, and by not seeking assistance or advice from the permanent embassy staff, failed to utilise valuable local knowledge (NAO/FCO, 2005, 16).

When a country does not have an embassy in the affected country, their foreign ministry becomes reliant on their other embassies in the region or on other countries with which they have a consular agreement. This is not ideal as the shared historical or political relations of countries such as Australia and the UK or Canada does not translate into geographical proximity that would be helpful in arranging joint evacuation/repatriation operations. Nonetheless, relationships can be effective when moving citizens to an out-of-country evacuation point, such as Cyprus during the Lebanon conflict, or to a temporarily-cohabitated embassy. During the conflict, DFAT (with no Australian embassy in Syria) evacuated Australians further afield to Jordan as 'administering in-coming evacuees could be more easily arranged from the nearest capital where [DFAT] did have a mission' (Dudgeon, 2006, 24). In addition, DFAT staff from Cairo to Damascus where they were co-located at the Canadian embassy to 'supervise the transit of evacuees through Syria' (Dudgeon, 2006, 24). The lack of embassy in Syria was problematic for Australia, but temporary consular cohabitation allowed Australian officials to work out of a key strategic base. Sweden was also faced with this problem during the Lebanon evacuations. The lack of a Swedish embassy in Lebanon led to problems with the division of responsibility and to organisational confusion. Reinforcements that were sent were supposed to be formally under the orders of the Swedish Ambassador to Syria, but 'in practice the temporary Stockholm-based staff in Beirut maintained close and direct contact with the operative management in Stockholm' (MFA Sweden, 2006, 22). Reinforcements are crucial to support large-scale responses, however a sudden deployment of staff can lead to confusion and questions of command and responsibility among the deployed, the receiving mission, and the foreign ministry headquarters.

In many cases, the coordination and cooperation process evolved with each major crisis. However, organisational knowledge may be lost when individuals change employment. Brändström and Örtenwall (2007, 63) noted that the evacuations from Bali, 'at least in its early phase – [could] be described as a number of initiatives by enterprising individuals rather than a co-ordinated national response'. Similarly, by coincidence, a Swedish foreign ministry official, on vacation in Lebanon, took over the duties of the consul in Beirut to organise the first evacuations (MFA Sweden, 2006, 7). Concerted self-reflective efforts soon after the event, as well as departmental and interdepartmental training consolidates key lessons learned, and utilises valuable knowledge gained during the response. When knowledge rests with individuals rather than job positions then haphazard transfer of that knowledge may mean the difference between a well and poorly coordinated response. Furthermore, governments can not be expected to establish well-staffed missions throughout every country, but this hurdle can be counteracted with processes that ensure highly effective communication, and mechanisms to ramp-up existing missions' capacity in times of crisis.

*3.2 Direct coordination of, and communication with, nationals*

A foreign ministry's direct assistance to its citizens is a key area of coordination in the acute phase of a consular emergency. Foreign ministry officials at the department headquarter and missions must facilitate a strategic exchange of information. Nationals may rely on the embassy staff for practical support, such as an escort from hospitals to evacuation flights (see Southwick et al., 2002, 626). Or as a symbolic link to home, providing emotional support or a conduit for communication with relatives. Lennquist and Hodgetts (2005, 33) noted that 'many injured had lost their mobile phones in the tsunami…[and] there was limited visibility of Embassy staff at the hospitals, who would have been a channel for patients to relay a message to next of kin'. Even when a large foreign ministry contingent is on the ground, if they are not visible, the opportunity to be an effective source of support is lost. Effective government communication is also required when nationals remain in-country or relatives and friends fly in to search for missing persons. Regarding Bali, some of the public expressed frustration with a lack of assistance in their search for missing relatives. Watts (2002, 1401) noted that 'consular officials from the two countries with the most victims—Australian and British—did not establish a help desk at the morgue for 3 days…some families seeking their loved ones found it difficult to get government advice'. This also pertained to the tsunami where the devastation was widespread. McGrory (2005) described 'a stream of families from Britain who, frustrated at waiting for news, are simply turning up to hunt for loved ones', and the NAO and Zito Trust (2006, 8) noted citizens were critical of inadequate information and advice, especially on what support they could expect from the UK officials on-the-ground.

Another communication hurdle was the dissemination of valuable information to nationals in distress on-the-ground, such as the departure time and location of evacuation flights. NAO and Zito Trust (2006, 7) noted criticisms that after the tsunami there were 'inadequately advertised' evacuation flights and UK nationals that had registered for these flights from Thailand were not given sufficient warning of their departure if warned at all. However, the communication failure did not necessarily lie with the embassy staff who, for example in Bangkok, complained 'that they had been given insufficient notice of the flight's arrival to enable them to inform many remaining British nationals…It also required Britons to have travelled from the coastal region to the Capital' (NAO/FCO, 2005, 11 and 20). It is commonplace for governments to place advertisements in local newspapers, post flyers at key meeting points, or information on their website, but this vital information can be easily missed by the hospitalised, or by citizens in transit through an affected area. The Swedish government used SMS initially after the tsunami (MFA Sweden, 2005) and more effectively in evacuations from Lebanon. A representative of Swedish cellular provider Telia described how 'mobile subscribers who were in Lebanon were sent an SMS…which told them that an evacuation would be taking place…[or] have told people to get to a certain hotel at a certain time, depending upon their priority status' (Roper, 2006). In many emergencies, technological support infrastructure may easily be disrupted or unreliable. However, effective communication mechanisms and the provision of prescient advice can reduce foreign ministries' workload by allowing those affected to assist themselves to a greater degree.

In a large-scale consular emergency many citizens will contribute vital information regarding missing persons and the event that needs to be effectively aggregated, communicated, and channelled. The volume of calls tends to necessitate opening a 'spill-over' call centre, which relieves the pressure on the foreign ministry's permanent call service. These spill-over call centres may still not have the capacity to handle the enormous number of calls (see further, Scanlon, 2007). After the Bali bombings, the Australian call centre received 10,000 calls regarding about 4700 individuals in the first 24 hours, and within two days they had received a further 20,000 calls (Brändström and Örtenwall, 2007, 51). In the tsunami's aftermath, the call centre logged more than 85,000 calls with 15,000 Australians reported as missing (Paterson, 2006, 5) and during the Lebanon conflict the call centre received 36,000 calls (DFAT, 2007, 175). Call centre volunteers are usually drawn from within the foreign ministry, but other government departments (primarily social services in Australia and police in the UK) may provide back-up personnel in spill-over call centres. This process is still subject to difficulties. Following the tsunami, the UK Permanent Under-Secretary of the FCO, Sir Michael Jay was questioned during a House of Commons hearing as to why 'operators were accused of not being sufficiently trained, poor information was collected and the whole system broke down'. His response was simply that 'the system was inadequate to cope with utterly unprecedented demand for it' (House of Commons, 2006). More generally, even when functioning smoothly, callers often had an

expectation that 'the government' ought to know more and had the most up to date information, which may not be the case as the call centre's function is to collect information that may assist stranded travellers or locate missing citizens.

## 3.3 Interdepartmental coordination

As consular emergencies are an international matter, the foreign ministry is the designated lead department. However, they do not have the resources or the influence that other agencies, such as the police or the defence department, may have. Other departments may already have significant relations with their counterparts in foreign governments. For instance, at the time of the Bali bombing, Australian Federal Police had a working relationship with the Indonesian police and AFP members were posted at more than 30 Australian missions abroad (Brändström and Örtenwall, 2007, 89). The Australian police, with expertise in Disaster Victim Identification (DVI), missing persons investigations and assisting distressed individuals, were a valuable part of the consular response. After the Bali bombings and the tsunami, the key relationship the FCO had with the UK police force was that of the Family Liaison Officer. A FLO assigned to families with a missing or deceased relative is used as the single contact for the family. This reduces stress for the family and assists families with procedures such as supplying relative's personal items for DVI. After the tsunami the FCO 'co-ordinated with the Metropolitan Police [regarding] the deployment of over 300 police family liaison officers - the largest deployment ever' (FCO, 2005, 171).

A government's defence department and armed forces are key in the resource sector, with transport, personnel, and general crisis management knowhow. They are of great use for aeromedical evacuation 'to move injured people from the affected areas to a higher level of health care' (Cook et al., 2006, 51). However, autonomous agencies will not necessarily wait for the official 'lead department' to notify them of requirements. For instance, the Australian Air Force's decision after the Bali bombings: 'CNN and other media began broadcasting news of the explosions on Bali and a terrorist action was mentioned. Throughout the entire preparatory phase, however, no additional information was received from higher command levels in the military hierarchy. The air force itself decided what should be done and launched their own operation' (Brändström and Örtenwall, 2007, 57-8). Yet, departments may not have an instinctive understanding that they will become involved in the consular response as they may be already responding to another aspect of the disaster, such as humanitarian relief. As such, valuable knowledge and resources may not be utilised. Following the tsunami, the UK Ministry of Defence 'did not assist in evacuating British nationals…because, under well established procedures for military evacuations, the armed forces only intervene in situations where there is armed conflict or a perceived threat of it' (NAO/FCO, 2005, 23).

There are also varying systems of government-wide coordination and groups established in response to foreign emergencies. The strategy in Australia is the Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force, which convened 19 times in the Bali bombings response (DFAT, 2003, 138). After Bali two parallel coordination processes (or 'hubs') developed, rather than one overarching interdepartmental response. It was decided that DFAT would coordinate departments in the international acute phase response and FaCS (Family and Community Services) would coordinate departments in the domestic response and recovery phase (Management Advisory Committee, 2004, 193), although, there were not always roles and responsibilities for all seemingly relevant agencies. Emergency Management Australia's 'role did not become clearer until patients began to arrive and it became obvious that they needed to be distributed to hospitals all over Australia' (Brändström and Örtenwall, 2007, 55).

Another available tool for the government during a consular emergency is an interdisciplinary team that can be flown in early to assess the extent of the problem and what is required to assist, or to quickly reinforce officials already on-the-ground. The multi-agency Swedish Response Team (SRT) which, commissioned by the foreign ministry, is activated by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, and supplements foreign ministry staff on-the-ground with personnel from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the National Board of Health and Welfare and the National Police Board (Kulling and Sigurdsson, 2008, 12). When deployed during the Lebanon conflict, the SRT set up its central operations at a key evacuee transit point, Cyprus, and deployed personnel to Beirut, as well as Syria and Turkey (Kulling and Sigurdsson, 2008, 13). The Australian

multi-agency Emergency Response Teams (ERT) is comprised of DFAT officials but also, for instance after the tsunami, included 'Australian Federal Police expertise in forensics and disaster victim identification [and] a medical team and counsellors from Centrelink' (DFAT, 2005, 152). 'Australian Defence Force linguists and logistics specialists were assigned to the team, and a chaplain and DFAT doctor [were] subsequently added' (Paterson, 2006, 5). During the Lebanon conflict more than 220 personnel were deployed as part of the ERTs    (Schwarz and McConnell, 2009, 243).

The Swedish Tsunami Commission identified a number of problems in the coordination of government departments, in particular 'leadership relations' between the foreign ministry and the Government Offices. Furthermore, within the foreign ministry 'there appears to have been uncertainty about who is the most senior executive with operative responsibility for crisis efforts of the kind that became necessary - the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs or the Director-General for Administrative Affairs. Most people seem to have considered the State Secretary should obviously have this role, but he had a different perception of his role' (Katastrofkommission, 2005, 513). Active attempts to alleviate confusion could be seen in the Lebanon conflict response with the utilisation of the Emergency Management Group, which 'may be convened in the event of serious consular crises or major disaster situations abroad' and is convened and chaired by the foreign ministry's Director-General for Consular Affairs (MFA Sweden, 2006, 4). The group met 24 times in two weeks and eventually came to include representatives from a number of key government agencies and on occasion the Foreign Minister and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs (MFA Sweden, 2006, 12-3).

In her discussion of the Bali response, the then deputy secretary of FaCS, Lisa Paul, noted communication issues between the international and domestic 'hubs' (2005, 31). For example, the state health departments were apparently, on the day following the attacks, 'ready to leap into action on their plans, but no-one was "switching them on" because the international side did not automatically switch on the domestic side'. Additionally, Paul noted that it was 'weird' that in the electronic age 'partly because of the security around DFAT's system, which is fair enough [communication] came down to face-to-face meetings and hard copy' (Paul, 2005, 32). There may be a common desire for communication and cooperation among departments in a consular emergency, but this does not come naturally. Formal structures such as Australia's IDETF or Sweden's Emergency Management Group, in which representatives of various departments are involved, tend to produce the most coherent, resource efficient response, as does familiarity with other departments and their speciality, which ideally is fostered prior to the next consular emergency rather than in the first days.

### 3.4 Coordination with the host government(s)

Effective coordination and cooperation with the government of the country (or countries) that have been directly impacted by the trigger (terrorist attack, natural disaster, civil unrest) of the consular emergency can be difficult when they are attempting to respond to their own citizens' needs, deal with infrastructure losses, and work with a large number of foreign governments and a multitude of other actors. In the aftermath of the Bali bombings, Australia's coordination with the Indonesia government benefitted from its prior working relationship. However, when the Indonesian government asked for assistance from Australia the day after the bombing, they specifically requested members of the AFP and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (Burgess, 2002, 6). This calls into question the relevance of the foreign ministry as the lead agency in different types of triggers for consular emergencies. The internationalisation of departments such as the Police and Intelligence agencies means that host governments may prefer to deal with departments that they are more familiar with rather than the designated lead department, the foreign ministry.

Despite positive prior relations facilitating cooperation with the host government, frustrations rise when working in an international crisis situation with countries that have differing protocols and standards. A complaint noted following the Bali bombings was that 'the Indonesian authorities completely failed to respond to the crisis. Soldiers were posted to guard the morgue, but instead of restricting access…anyone and everyone was allowed to wander among the bodies' (Watts, 2002, 1401). Crisis situations are already challenging but the lack of control over other nations' personnel and differences in culture and traditions, for example, rapid burial or cremation of bodies can cause distress to the families of foreign nationals. Possible

misunderstandings need to be speedily clarified with the host government where possible. After the tsunami, the Swedish government tried to reassure its citizens that they had arranged guarantees that cremations of foreigners would not occur. The report by a Swedish newspaper, Svenska Dagbladet, that 'dead bodies [were] placed in the "mass graves" prompted the German, Swedish and Dutch ambassadors in Thailand to demand an explanation from government officials in Bangkok' (The Local, 2005).

The triggers that ignite a consular emergency inevitably cause great hardship and devastation to the citizens of the affected country. Governments responding to consular emergencies will also often respond to the humanitarian issue, but response operations will invariably overlap, raising the contentious issue of prioritising one's own nationals or even foreign nationals in general. Following the Bali bombings, the Indonesian airport authorities refused to allow Indonesian citizens to be evacuated from Bali (Brändström and Örtenwall, 2007, 67-8). However, the Australian Foreign Minister later announced that 'Indonesians wounded in the Kuta bombings would be flown to Australia for medical treatment…Immigration officials have allowed the foreigners to enter on "special purpose" visas' (Saunders and Powell, 2002). Much of the criticism was directed at responding countries who were thought to have prioritized their own citizens while abandoning the locals. A British volunteer said 'it's a very difficult issue…at times some of us felt more could have been done for the Balinese'. In response, the head surgeon as Denpasar's main hospital, Tjakra Wibawa, was quoted as saying: 'If there is a car crash and your children are involved along with other people's children, you will look after your own first. It is normal, natural' (Spillius, 2002). A similar situation arose in Thailand after the tsunami, where individuals working at overloaded hospitals felt that there was not enough assistance or support from foreign countries whose citizens were being treated (Lennquist and Hodgetts, 2005, 32).

In 2006 the location of the emergency was Lebanon, but it was the surrounding governments that proved to be the necessary targets of coordination and cooperation. Foreign ministries needed to coordinate with other countries in the region. 'Evacuees could not be brought directly back to Australia by air from Lebanon and they had to transit third countries. This involved negotiating the co-operation of such countries as Syria, Jordan, Cyprus and Turkey to receive the evacuees, and temporarily accommodate them pending their onward movement. Without that co-operation, an evacuation of this size would have been very difficult, probably impossible' (Dudgeon, 2006, 23). More importantly, Sweden, Australia, the UK and numerous other governments also had to coordinate with Israel. As Lebanon was a war zone, diplomacy and detailed coordination was key to ensuring the safe passage of evacuees. 'The Australian government, as for other governments, was in regular contact with the Israeli government to inform them of the whereabouts of Australian residents in Lebanon, and particularly their evacuation movements' (Dudgeon, 2006, 24). Coordination and cooperation was difficult to maintain. The Australian Foreign Minister said that he had asked for 'a short ceasefire in order to enable our nationals and other foreign nationals to get out of southern Lebanon…The Israelis have so far said that this was a war zone, that they wouldn't agree to our requests' (Downer interview transcript, 2006). The Swedish authorities contacted Israel to obtain assurance of a safe passage by a sea route and were provided with 'verbal assurances that no military attacks would be made along the planned route' (Kulling and Sigurdsson, 2008, 32-3). However, these granted periods of safe passage were very strictly enforced by Israel. The British Ambassador to Lebanon said that, 'the Israelis are giving safe passage but they're being pretty hardnosed about it…If they say you have a window, that's it' (quoted in Whitaker, 2006). Simultaneous diplomatic discussions with multiple 'host' or neighbouring governments are likely to be required in a large-scale consular emergency. In the case of the Lebanon evacuations, the consequences of poor coordination with key governments such as Israel would have been disastrous for the consular response.

*3.5 Coordination between responding governments: bilateral and supranational*

In all three emergencies, a large number of foreign countries had citizens in distress. It therefore made sense for them to coordinate and cooperate as they had similar consular crisis management goals. Although formal and informal consular agreements exist, such as between the Commonwealth countries or between EU member states, these are intended for small-scale cases, primarily when a consular partner does not have a

mission in a foreign country. These agreements are not called into force during a large-scale emergency, as the time pressure and distance may de-prioritize closely coordinated multinational action. It may be unproductive in an emergency to organise along these lines due to political or public pressure to rescue ones' own citizens immediately, or other countries' strict visa restrictions. However, in all three cases there were several areas and a number of incidences of bilateral cooperation between responding countries, including those with consular agreements. This occurred in most stages of response, particularly in the locating of citizens, evacuation of survivors, medical evacuation of injured, and identification of the deceased.

The responding governments that arrive first may take greater consular responsibility for the specific region and in assisting other countries' nationals. For example, following the Bali bombing, the Australian government was one of the first foreign countries to respond, and did so with more resources than any other (realising early on that Australians would be disproportionately affected). Within three days Australia had evacuated citizens of Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and the UK (Burgess, 2002, 8). After the bombardment of Lebanon began, Sweden responded rapidly to evacuate citizens, and were subsequently 'responsible for coordinating the reception of other EU countries' citizens, since the Swedish personnel were first in place in Larnaca' - a key strategic reception point in Cyprus (Kulling and Sigurdsson, 2008, 14).

Bilateral coordination can alleviate serious supply issues if responding countries are competing for limited resources on-the-ground. In Lebanon, countries such as Australia did not already have vessels in the area and were so geographically removed that sending domestic resources was not feasible. As such, they had to acquire local, often private, resources. It was reported that 'at Beirut port, Australia's ambassador to Lebanon, Lyndall Sachs, accused her German counterparts of "commandeering all the buses" in Beirut' (McGeough, 2006) and a DFAT spokesperson was quoted as saying that "we and other governments have faced considerable difficulties securing vessels for evacuation due to the very tight market for ferry charters" (Nicholson, 2006a). In one incident a private owner of a vessel had Canada and Australia bidding for the same vessel. Both parties believed they had secured the vessel and had spent valuable time doing so. Canada won the bid, but this left Australian evacuees stranded after travelling to the meeting point. There were reports of 'angry scenes erupt[ing] at Beirut docks as more than 100 Australians left stranded in the bombed city demanded answers and action from consular officials' (Wilson, 2006).

Even though bilateral cooperation is helpful in the evacuation stage, a group of nationals that is evacuated by another government's transport can be overlooked when consular officials are busy processing their own people. A WorldReach study of the Lebanon evacuations found that while 'some national governments offered space on boats and planes to non-citizens…these governments were often not able to offer detailed information on these citizens…for the receiving party. [Although] some countries did endeavor to share information with the countries on whose behalf they were extricating citizens' (WorldReach, 2007, 4). This issue can continue even after the evacuees have landed or docked safely, and is not just a problem with communication, but also the laws and protocols of the different countries that are evacuating each other's citizens. Following the evacuation of a Swedish citizen from Bali to Australia, stringent Australian Privacy Laws impeded Swedish embassy staff in finding their hospitalised citizen (Brändström and Örtenwall, 2007, 53).

In the evacuation process, sometimes countries geographically located in a similar part of the world bilaterally evacuate foreign nationals who are then transferred onward to their own country. This process was used within the Nordic countries following the tsunami (Disaster Medicine Study Organisation, 2008, 18). When the first flights from Thailand arrived in Stockholm, the crisis centre at Arlanda airport included Norwegian and Danish embassy staff (Disaster Medicine Study Organisation, 2008, 27). Similarly when Swedish citizens arrived in Copenhagen and Oslo during the Lebanon evacuations there were Swedish embassy staff waiting at the airports (MFA Sweden, 2006, 26).

Although a formal European Union response was discussed early in the Lebanon conflict, it 'did not produce any concrete results' (MFA Sweden, 2006, 23-4). The Swedish foreign ministry recognised during the Lebanon evacuations the value of working regionally, and favoured a cooperative Nordic response over an official EU response because 'the Nordic countries work with a different circle to protect than many other

European countries. Under Swedish rules, in addition to citizenship, it is permanent residence – settlement – in the country that in most cases is decisive for the right to different kinds of consular support. Many other EU countries link that right exclusively to citizenship' (MFA Sweden, 2006, 23-4). The Swedish Tsunami Commission had also previously concluded that rather than an EU consular operation, 'informal networks between nations appear to be the main complement to national emergency preparedness' (Katastrofkommission, 2005, 534).

There were however, areas where EU cooperation was applauded, although it was more often than not, 'European' cooperation, particularly including non-EU member state, Norway (Kulling and Sigurdsson, 2008, 34-5). After the tsunami, daily conference calls between EU crisis managers were praised by the FCO (NAO/FCO, 2005, 21). Despite early discussions of a joint EU response to the Lebanon conflict, the most beneficial cooperation was communication and the EU-wide conference calls. The first EU member state conference call 'at the capital level' was on 13 July and from then on the EU member states held daily conference calls (MFA Sweden, 2006, 7). The Finnish government, holding the EU presidency at the time, was particularly active in the 'virtual meetings' which the Swedish foreign ministry described as 'the most important channel for exchanges of information between the member states' (MFA Sweden, 2006, 23).

Deliberate bilateral coordination is a great asset during widespread disasters. However, bilateral cooperation is less effective when citizens on-the-ground do not realise that they may be able to receive assistance from officials of other countries. Efforts such as the ones described above, in which one country searches for and coordinates the transportation of nationals other than its own, loses its efficacy if citizens do not make use of the assistance. Governments are then accused of abandonment when real efforts at coordination and assistance were made. Yet, formal agreements are problematic to rely on in a consular emergency situation. There are large unknowns in each crisis: the extent, the number affected, the constellation of nationals involved, and thus knowing what needs to be deployed and when. While regional cooperation among Nordic countries tends to work well, for example having foreign representation at the airports to assist incoming citizens, it is unrealistic to expect a foreign ministry to deploy staff to the major airports of 26 EU member states. Nonetheless, sharing of information appeared to be a positive result of attempts at an EU joint effort. It may be too convoluted to organise 27 member states' resources in the middle of a war zone, but conference calls can ensure all states are aware of significant changes in the situation, and can lead to fortuitous bilateral on-the-ground cooperation where appropriate.

## 4. Conclusions: the challenge of coordination and cooperation

A foreign crisis presents challenges different from that of a domestic emergency: often, not only a greater geographical distance, but also a pronounced lack of autonomy or control of the response. While respecting the sovereignty of the host country, cultural differences or language barriers, as well as the simple practicality of working across significant time zones and immigration protocols, need to be addressed. For foreign ministry staff, large-scale consular emergencies may be difficult to immediately recognise among the numerous smaller consular responses foreign ministries deal with each year. However, common in the three events studied here was the need for rapid and sizable reinforcements both on-the-ground and back home. Call centres were a good example, especially as many of the reinforcements from departments may not be familiar with consular procedure and protocol, but are suddenly handling calls from distressed nationals and concerned relatives. Standardising the call procedure, even for differently triggered consular emergencies, can help call handlers obtain the most relevant information. Similarly, a sudden ramp up of staff on-the-ground is logistically difficult, and while the small rapid deployment teams can quickly assess the situation, a geographically widespread consular emergency, or one with large numbers affected, can quickly eclipse a team of even a dozen specially trained personnel.

Responding to large-scale consular emergencies is a task that modern day governments and more specifically, foreign ministries must prepare for with well-developed policies and strategic practices, ahead of the next large-scale consular emergency. This preparation may be in the form of training their own staff for events such as the three studied here or attempting to prepare citizens for what they should expect of their government. The UK, Sweden and Australia all run public campaigns informing citizens of what assistance

they can and can not expect while abroad. Yet this does not necessarily translate well when a highly-publicised, highly-distressing event materialises. Managing expectations plays a significant part in large-scale consular response. Foreign ministries receive a great deal of criticism from individuals or relatives who are frustrated and distressed in the affected country, or who feel helpless back home. There is also a great deal of praise from individuals who are grateful to be out of a terrifying situation and reunited with loved ones. It is a difficult balance for the foreign ministry. On the one hand, there is no formal obligation requiring the government to use taxpayers dollars to deploy to a disaster zone and evacuate its nationals, but governments have done this, and many times over. Highly publicised responses increase public expectation next time disaster strikes. Yet it is now problematic for the foreign ministry to pull back and do less than was done previously. The department (or its current government) will likely be accused of abandonment of its national citizens, its constituents. One thing is clear though: the current trend towards a self-reinforcing spiral of greater expectations pressuring a more comprehensive response and vice versa is unsustainable in monetary, practical and, ultimately, political terms.

Can governments coordinate internally and externally in a multi-agency and multinational setting that is marked by significant time pressures, uncertainty, high public expectations, a bright media spotlight, and external threats to their own citizens? This paper has considered three major consular emergencies from three governments' perspectives: the mechanisms employed; the barriers and challenges faced; the relationships of key actors; and how agencies communicated in their attempt to coordinate and cooperate to achieve the goal of consular assistance en masse. Given the findings, one could argue that they can. An emergency abroad brings into play an extraordinary number of challenges that governments rarely face in a domestic setting, yet, the lack of protectionist departmental cultures and goodwill was noted in an interdepartmental setting (Management Advisory Committee, 2004; Paul, 2005). Furthermore, if one considers the objective (whether to locate, evacuate, identify, or console) - if and when these objectives were achieved, they so often originated from interdepartmental, bilateral, and regional cooperation and coordination efforts. However, coordination and cooperation does not happen naturally on a large-scale although ad hoc incidents are widely reported. Following each event there were numerous criticisms heaped upon foreign ministries and their government for missed opportunities, poor planning, poor implementation, or poor learning. Ineffective coordination and cooperation increased the distress of citizens, wasted valuable time, and cost lives. So while this paper has demonstrated that there is certainly a highly valuable aptitude for coordination and cooperation among actors, there still exist great barriers to effective implementation. If foreign ministries and their governments intend to continue responding to large-scale consular emergencies, their capacity to cooperate must be enhanced to meet significant and wide-ranging challenges.

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