

# **Integrated Safety Systems for Tankfarms**

with SIMATIC Safety Integrated

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## Objective of safety engineering

To avoid accidents and damage when a fault occurs and to ensure maximum safety for

### People



### Process



### Environment/ nature




## Negligence blamed for Buncefield explosion

A 2006 report by an independent investigation board did not apportion blame, but found **that human error and faulty safety equipment** were responsible.


Total UK admitted that 300 tonnes of fuel was spilled after a gauge failed to register that a storage tank was full. But the company argues that it was not liable for damages because it could not reasonably have predicted the spillage would have such devastating consequences.




# Safety concept for a plant



## Cause of faults in automation systems



**Risk analysis → risk minimization**



**"Zero risk" is not feasible**

## Risk Analysis -> HAZOP

### **Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP)**

The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a widely used formal technique for examining potential safety and operational problems associated with a system.

A HAZOP study is usually carried out by a team, headed by a chairman and a secretary, who have experience both in the use of the HAZOP technique and the system under investigation.



## International safety standards



Commission Electrotechnique Internationale  
International Electrotechnical Commission  
Международная Электротехническая Комиссия

### IEC61508

IEC 61508 serves as the basic standard and basis for safety standardization. It covers all areas where electrical, electronic or PLC systems are used to realize safety-related protection functions.




Commission Electrotechnique Internationale  
International Electrotechnical Commission  
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### IEC61511

There are sector-specific standards based on IEC 61508, such as IEC 61511 for the process industry or IEC 61513 for the nuclear industry. These sector standards are important for planners and operators of corresponding plants.

# Evaluation of risk to define the SIL risk chart

## Safety Integrity Level



**a = no special safety requirements**  
**b = individual safety system insufficient**

### Effect

- Ca** Minor injury
- Cb** Major, irreversible injury or death of one person
- Cc** Death of several persons
- Cd** Death of very many persons

### Frequency and duration

- Fa** Seldom to often
- Fb** Frequent to constant

### Danger prevention

- Pa** Possible under cert. circum.
- Pb** Nearly impossible

### Probability of occurrence

- W1** Very low
- W2** Low
- W3** Relatively high

## Target Safety Integrity Levels


Safety Integrity Level	Probability of failure on demand (PFD) per year (Demand mode of operation)	Risk Reduction Factor = 1/PFD
<b>SIL 4</b>	<b><math>\geq 10^{-5}</math> to <math>&lt; 10^{-4}</math></b>	<b>100000 to 10000</b>
<b>SIL 3</b>	<b><math>\geq 10^{-4}</math> to <math>&lt; 10^{-3}</math></b>	<b>10000 to 1000</b>
<b>SIL 2</b>	<b><math>\geq 10^{-3}</math> to <math>&lt; 10^{-2}</math></b>	<b>1000 to 100</b>
<b>SIL 1</b>	<b><math>\geq 10^{-2}</math> to <math>&lt; 10^{-1}</math></b>	<b>100 to 10</b>

**SIL: A performance criteria of a SIS, among other things, describes the probability of failure on demand.**


# Safety Functions

## IEC 61508

Considering the complete **safety functionality** of loops acc. to IEC 61508:




Each safety function always comprises the entire chain, from the collection and processing of information to the intended action



# Simplified SIL Calculation

## SIL of a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF)



$$\text{Overall SIF PFDavg} = (\text{PFDPT} * \text{PFDPT}) + \text{PFD AI} + \text{PFD CPU} + \text{PFD Com} + \text{PFD DO} + (\text{PFD Valve} * \text{PFD Valve})$$

For Sensors and actors evaluation:

Pressure transmitter: MTTF = 600 years

Failure rate ( $\lambda$ ) = 1 / MTTF (mean time to failure)

For SIF

IEC61508 specifies:  $\lambda_d = (\lambda_{du} + \lambda_{dd}) = \lambda/2$

Dangerous failure rate  $\lambda_d$  = half of the total failure rate ( $\lambda$ )


$\text{PFDavg} = I^D t/2$

**RRF (Risk Reduction Factor) = 1/PFDavg**

# Integrated Control & Safety




## The “Right” Level of Integration



# Safety Instrumented System (SIS)


SIS: A combination of sensors, logic units (e.g. controllers) and actuators which detect abnormal operating conditions and AUTOMATICALLY switch the plant to a safe state.





## Overview totally integrated solution with PCS7


**SIMATIC PCS 7**  
Takes you beyond the limits!



# SIMATIC Safety Integrated

## The Concept

SIEMENS



## Safety Integrated for Process Automation

Common controller platform for process control and process safety

- One hardware for all

One engineering system for process control and process safety application

- Reduces training and uses the available knowledge

User-friendly display of process safety information in PCS 7

Automatic integration of process safety diagnostics into the operator interface

Direct communication between DCS and SIS


- Less engineering work

# Flexible Modular Redundancy




# Typical Tank Farm Lay-out


## Simplified concept distributed I/O




## Flexible Modular Redundancy (FMR)



- Redundant S7-400FH
- Redundant PROFIBUS DP
- Switched I/O – ET 200M




- Redundant S7-400FH
- Redundant PROFIBUS DP
- Redundant I/O – ET 200M




- Redundant S7-400FH
- Redundant PROFIBUS DP
- Redundant, switched I/O – ET 200M

## Flexible Modular Redundancy (FMR)



## Flexible Modular Redundancy (FMR)



### Multiple Fault Tolerant

- Fieldbus architecture allows system to tolerate multiple faults without interruption
- I/O redundancy independent of CPU redundancy
- All components rated for SIL3
- No degraded mode
- Safety not dependent on redundancy

**1002 Valves**



## Flexible Modular Redundancy (FMR)

Safety Integrity Level **up to SIL 3** with one controller

- Highest Safety Integrity Level

### Highest Flexibility

- Separate or combine safety and standard application in one CPU
- Use redundancy for safety only where it is needed
- Parallel use of PROFIsafe on PROFIBUS

### Highest Availability through Multiple Fault Tolerance

- Architecture allows system to tolerate multiple faults
- IO redundancy independent of CPU redundancy
- IO and device redundancy can be matched to maximize availability

### Cost reducing

- Use redundancy only where you need it for safety or availability
- Parallel use of PROFIsafe on PROFIBUS

# **Safety Lifecycle Engineering**



## The IEC 61511(ISA S84) Safety Lifecycle

The different phases of the safety Lifecycle

- **Analysis Phase**

- Identification of Hazards and Risks
- Development of the Safety Requirement Specification for the Safety Instrumented System
- Allocation of Safety Function to Protective Layers



**PHA-Pro<sup>6</sup>**




- **Realization Phase**

- Design and Engineering of Safety Instrumented System
- Design and Development of other Means of Risk Reduction
- Installation, Commissioning & Validation

- **Operation Phase**

- Operation & Maintenance
- Modification
- Decommissioning



# The Realization Phase with the Safety Matrix

Configuration of the Safety Functions with the Cause & Effects Method

Automatic TÜV-certified Creation of the Safety Logic from the Cause & Effect matrix

Easy Configuration without special Programming Knowledge

SIMATIC Safety Matrix - [SM\_Demo -- SM\_ISA\_N\Plant ESD]

File Edit View Tools Window Help

## SIMATIC SAFETY MATRIX

All Groups

Input Tag	Func	Limit/Trip	EngUnit	Cause Description	Num	Effect Description																
						1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14			
PS_100		FALSE		Feed Pump High Pressure Switch	1	N																
LSH_100		TRUE		Tank_100 Level switch high	2	2S	S	S	R	2N												
LSL_200		TRUE		Hopper_200 Level switch Low	3		N	N	2S													
PSH_200		TRUE		Hopper_200 High Pressure	4		N	N	V													
PT_100		H 38.00	PSIG	Feed pressure	5	S	S	S														
LT_100		H 50.00	Feet	Tank Level	6	2S	N	N		2N												
PT_101	Vote	H 26.00	in_H20	Tank Pressure	7				N	2N	S											
PT_102		D 3.0																				
PT_103																						
LT_200		H 50.00	Ft	Hopper Level	8				2S													
TS_101	AND	FALSE		Tank_100 High Temperature switch	9																	
TS_102		FALSE																				
TS_103		FALSE																				

Ready





# Summary



# Process Safety and Totally Integrated Automation

## Integrated Control & Safety

- Best Integration into the distributed control system PCS 7
- Less training and easy handling due using same tools
- Less hardware due using same CPU for standard and safety

## Flexible Modular Redundancy

- Save money by mix and match to meet the goals of the application
- Highest availability due the multiple fault tolerance

## Integrated Safety Fieldbus

- Less wiring due PROFIsafe on PROFIBUS, one cable for the communication safe and non-safe
- Prepared for safety fieldbus instruments

## Safety Lifecycle Engineering

- Safety Matrix supports the phases of the Safety Lifecycle

# Process Safety and Totally Integrated Automation



Integrated safety...

... embedded profitability

**Totally Integrated  
Automation**